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The Grinnell Test of Monopolization Sounds a False Alarm: Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen
Highlands Skiing Corp.' — With enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act 2 (the Act) in
1890, Congress established a federal law of antitrust, imposing criminal and civil penalties
upon businesses and individuals who engage in anticompetitive conduct. Section 1 of
the Act prohibits contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of trade and
functions as a broad proscription against collusive agreements among competitors which
have the pu-rpose and effect of reducing competition.' Section 2 condemns monopolies,
attempts to monopolize, and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize any part of
interstate trade or commerce, and thus reaches both concerted and unilateral conduct .4
Yet while sections 1 and 2 of the Act catalog in broad terms the various illegal practices
at which the Act's enforcement provisions are directed, the text of the Act itself provides
no clear criteria or tests to define and identify the proscribed anticompetitive conduct.'
Thus, it has largely been left to the courts to formalize the elements required to make
out a prima facie case for a section 1 or section 2 Sherman Act violations
2 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
2 15 U.S.C. ft§ 1-7 (1982), For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Act, see 1-6 P. AREEDA
& D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1978) [hereinafter AREEDA & TURNER); R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX (1978); A.D. NEALE & D.C. GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA (1980); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977); 1-3 VON KALINOWSKI,
ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION (1985).
3 Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a
felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million
dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion
of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
4 Section 2 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by impris-
onment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of
the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
5
 In a recent section 1 case the Supreme Court noted candidly that the Sherman Act itself
provides no more than ,broad definitions of the conduct it means to proscribe. United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 438-39 (1978). "The Sherman Act, unlike most traditional
criminal statutes, does not, in clear and categorical terms, precisely identify the conduct which it
proscribes." Id. at 438 (footnote omitted), See also REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL
COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 349 (1955) (quoted in United States Gypsum, 438 U.S.
at 439) ("The Sherman Act, inevitably perhaps, is couched in language broad and general ....
Thus it may be difficult for today's businessman to tell in advance whether projected actions will
run afoul of the Sherman Act's criminal strictures."). The indeterminancy of the Sherman Act's
standards, however, does not preclude its enforcement on grounds that it is unconstitutionally
vague. Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 376-78 (1913).
6
 Indeed, the framers of the Act recognized that the statute left to the courts the critical task
of developing tests to distinguish lawful from unlawful conduct. Senator Sherman himself noted
that "all that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles, and we can be assured that
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It is clear from both the legislative history surrounding passage of the Sherman Act
and from the judicial decisions interpreting the Act that section 2 does not prohibit
monopoly per se. 7
 The Senate debates on the Sherman Act reflect the intention of the
drafters that the Act only prohibit monopolies acquired through abuse of the competitive
process, not those legitimately obtained through lawful competitive conduct') Unlawful
monopolization, as proscribed by the Act, necessarily involves the unfair or unreasonable
use of monopoly power, 9
 as distinct from monopoly attained by superior skill in "com-
petition on the merits") which may appropriately be labeled honestly industrial." Thus,
only unfair conduct — those practices which constitute the active use of monopoly power
to exclude rivals — is unlawful under the Act."
the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law ...." 21 Conic. REC. 2460
(1980) (quoted in United States Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 438 n.14).
7
 "Mere monopoly" or "monopoly in the concrete" is not itself unlawful absent wrongful conduct
or intent on the part of the monopolist in achieving the monopoly. See Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767 n.14 (1984); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708 (1927);
United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. I, 60-62 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-83
(1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
8
 Indeed, the sponsors of the Act explicitly intended to exempt from the Act's proscriptions
one "who merely by superior skill and intelligence ... got the whole business because nobody could
do it as well." 21 CONG. REC. 3151-52 (1890) (remarks of Senator Hoar).
9
 Unlawful monopolization, as appreciated by the drafters, involved "something like the use of
means which made it impossible for other persons to engage in fair competition, like the engrossing,
the buying up of all other persons in the same business." 21 CONG. REC. 3161-62 (1890) (remarks
of Senator Hoar).
19
 As the phrase is used throughout this casenote, "competition on the merits" envisions pricing
and marketing behavior which reflects the skill, foresight, industry, and/or efficiency of the com-
petitor. The firm that excludes rivals by "building a better mousetrap" or by "building it more.
cheaply" is merely competing on the merits and should not be held in violation of the antitrust
laws. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 1111626a–b. The firm that sells that mousetrap at prices
below its costs of production or buys up all of the raw materials required to build mousetraps,
however, for purposes of driving all of its competitors from the mousetrap market is said to be
acting in a "predatory" manner, that is, in a manner that goes beyond competition with its rivals
on the firms' respective merits. This kind of predatory behavior violates the antitrust laws. Id. As
one commentator describes:
Predatory business conduct can be defined as conduct which has the purpose and
effect of advancing the actor's competitive position, not by improving the actor's
market performance, but by threatening to injure or injuring actual or potential
competitors, so as to drive or keep them out of the market, or force them to compete
less effectively .... The predator seeks not to win the field by greater efficiency, better
services, or lower prices reflective of cost savings or modest profits. The predatory
firm tries to inhibit others in ways independent of the predator's own ability to perform
effectively in the market .... The predation is likely to involve present losses to the
predator, or at all events to foreclose profits which could currently be earned, detri-
ments which are accepted by the predator as the cost of freeing itself for the future
from the competition it now faces.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 43.
II Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431.
12 Id. at 430. Section 2 envisions conduct beyond competition on the merits, that is, conduct
that is unnecessarily "exclusionary" or "predatory" and appears to be reasonably capable of making
a significant contribution to creating or maintaining monopoly power. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 2, ¶ 626c. It encompasses conduct that unnecessarily impairs the opportunities of rivals, id.
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Indeed, courts and commentators have been careful to draw the line between
legitimately gained monopoly and improper monopoly obtained through anticompetitive
practices, so as to avoid penalizing legitimately successful industrial conduct which hap-
pens to result in monopoly power." It is only "exclusionary" behavior, that which pre-
vents actual or potential rivals from competing, or which impairs their opportunities to
do so effectively that the Act prohibits." To penalize legitimate competitive conduct that
¶ 626b, and practices that "represent something more than the use of accessible resources, the
process of invention and innovation, and the employ of those techniques of employment, financing,
production, and distribution, which a competitive society must foster." United States v. United Shoe
Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 344-45 (D. Mass. 1953), aff 'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
See United States v. Swift & Co., where the Court stated "[m]ere size is not an offense against
the Sherman Act unless magnified to the point at which it amounts to a monopoly ... but size
carries with it an opportunity for abuse that is not to be ignored when the opportunity is proved
to have been utilized in the past." 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1931). See also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 2, 1111625b-626; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, 43. As one commentator notes, "[c]ertainly the
evils at which the Act was aimed, primarily excessive prices and excessive private power, were seen
by those who sponsored the Act as stemming, not from inevitable responses to market structure,
but from wrongful conduct." L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, 38 (emphasis added) (citing Letwin, Congress
and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L. REV. 221 (1956); H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL
ANTITRUST POLICY, 180-85, 226-29 (1955)).
13 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431. This distinction is also present in the standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in Grinnell, where the Court announced that in order to find the offense of monopoly under
section 2 of the Sherman Act, the antitrust plaintiff must show the willful acquisition or mainte-
nance of that [monopoly] power [by the monopolist] as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." Grinnell, 348 U.S.
at 570-71. This critical distinction dates from the earliest cases decided under the Sherman Act.
See United States v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 U.S. 214, 230 (1922) ("normal and natural growth
and development" distinguished from "the formation of holding companies, or stock purchases,
resulting in the unified control of different roads or systems, naturally competitive"); United States
v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920) ("normal expansion to meet the demands of a business
growing as a result of superior and enterprising management" distinguished From "deliberate,
calculated purchase for control"); Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 75-76 (development of business power
by usual or normal methods contrasted with methods reflecting an intent to exclude competitors);
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 181 ("mere exertion of the ordinary right to contract and to trade"
distinguished from "methods devised in order to monopolize the trade by driving competitors out
of business").
14 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 11 626b. Because all competitive moves tend to exclude, it
is only unnecessarily exclusionary conduct which the antitrust laws prohibit. Id. Only acts which are
not "honestly industrial" (derived from superior skill, foresight, and industry), but rather impair
the opportunities of rivals and corrupt competition on the merits are "unnecessarily exclusionary"
and thus violative of the Sherman Act. Id. Thus, the firm that excludes its competitors by selling a
superior product or by producing at substantially lower costs than its rivals due to successful research
and development, high-quality production processes, cost reducing innovations, and the like, is
merely competing successfully on the merits with its rivals. The Sherman Act welcomes such
conduct, beneficial to the cause of competition, and thus it is not considered "exclusionary" for
section 2 purposes, even if monopoly results. Id.
Indeed, the Act is not concerned with protecting competitors against competition from their
more efficient rivals, but, rather, with protecting the competitive process against unreasonable
restraints and abuse. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 488; Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 320; Oreck Corp. v,
Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 946 (1979). This
principle echoes in the decisions of several of the circuits, which require proof of exclusionary
conduct to support a section 2 monopolization claim, as distinct from mere aggressive competitive
behavior which happens to harm a rival, See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603
F.2d 263, 273-75 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980), in which the Second Circuir
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happens to result in monopoly power would deter large firms from competing vigorously
on the merits with their smaller rivals and produce the paradoxical result of discouraging,
rather than promoting, competition." In sum, section 2 of the Sherman Act does not
proscribe aggressive competitive behavior that is no more restrictive of rivals' opportu-
nities than is reasonably necessary to effect competition on the merits, even where such
behavior increases the market share of a dominant firm at the expense of its smaller
competitors."
Among the most common practices alleged to constitute monopolization in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act is the monopolist's refusal to deal with a competitor.°
The questions of when and under what circumstances a monopolist has a duty to deal
are, however, among the most controverted and unsettled in the antitrust field." In
noted that "[t]he mere possession of monopoly power is not illegal. A monopolist who achieves that
status because of 'a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident' cannot be faulted."
Monopolies thus obtained are "tolerated but not cherished" because of "considerations of fairness
and the need to preserve proper economic incentives." Id.; California Computer Products, Inc., v.
International Business Mach. Corp. (Cakomp), 613 F.2d 727, 735 n.6 (9th Cir. 1979) in which the
Ninth Circuit observed that "[plower obtained or maintained by the kind of behavior that compe-
tition is thought to foster, if not compel, [is] immune [from antitrust scrutiny] even though businesses
[may be] destroyed in the process." Id. (quoting C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 20
(1959). See also Telex Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 925-26 (10th
Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975). The Telex court held that in determining what is unneces-
sarily exclusionary conduct, "[t]he first factor is whether or not the acts are ordinary business
practices typical of those used in a competitive market, and secondly, whether the acts constitute
the use of monopoly power." Id. (emphasis in original).
is Judge Learned Hand noted in Alcoa:
A single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely
by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry. In such cases a strong argument
can be made that, although the result may expose the public to the evils of monopoly,
the Act does not mean to condemn the resultant of those very forces which is its prime
objective to foster: finis opus coronat. The successful competitor, having been urged
to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430. Indeed, because the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect the competitive
process and not individual competitors, Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962), an intent to prevail
in competition on the merits, even to the point of capturing all the customers of an inefficient rival,
is not unlawful, even if the resulting conduct is fatal to the rival. United States Steel, 251 U.S. at 450.
As the Court noted in Copperweld, "an efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an
inefficient rival .... This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that
promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767.
See also United States Steel, 251 U.S. at 450-51; American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. at 180.
' 6 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 9 626b. See Foremost Pro Color v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
703 F.2d 534, 544 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A monopolist, no less than any other competitor, is permitted
and indeed encouraged to compete aggressively on the merits . . ."); Sargent-Welch Scientific Co.
v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 712 (7th Cir..1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 822 (1978) (a monopolist
is not forbidden from improving its efficiency in manufacturing or marketing, for example, even
though the effect of doing so may be to improve its sales at the expense of its smaller rivals).
"See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 2, 48; 10 VON KALINOWSK1, supra note 2, 661.01-03;
Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. Rev. 847 (1955); Fulda,
Individual Refusal to Deal: When Does Single-Firm Conduct Become Vertical Restraint?, 30 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 590 (1965); Note, Refusals to Deal by Vertically Integrated Monopolists, 87 HARV. L. REv.
1720 (1974); Annotation, Refusals to Deal as Violations of the Federal Antitrust Laws, 41 A.L.R. FED.
175 (1979).
L8 Byars v. Bluff City News Co., Inc., 609 F.2d 843, 846 (6th Cir. 1979).
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resolving cases of monopolists' alleged anticompetitive refusals to deal, the courts have
long distinguished between concerted refusals to deal,' 9 or group boycotts, and unilateral
refusals to dea1. 2° The former are in many cases per se violations of section 1 of the
Sherman Act;" unilateral refusals to deal, on the other hand, are generally permissible
under the Act."
Courts and commentators generally agree that a unilateral refusal to deal constitutes
illegal monopolization only where the monopolist's refusal unnecessarily excludes com-
petitors or impairs the process of competition on the merits." Thus, a unilateral refusal
19 A concerted refusal to deal occurs where a group of competitors unlawfully organizes to
boycott a particular buyer or seller for the purpose of unreasonably restraining trade, controlling
a market, or creating a monopoly. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers v, Pacific Stationers,
472 U.S. 284, 287-90 (1985); United States v. General Motors Corp„ 384 U.S. 127, 129-30 (1966);
Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 692-96 (1962); Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-13 (1959); Fashion Originator's Guild, Inc. v.
Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457, 461-62 (1941); Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 603 (1914).
so A unilateral refusal to deal occurs where an individual manufacturer, distributor, or firm,
acting alone and in the exercise of its own independent discretion, declines to buy from or sell to
a particular business concern or individual. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 14-
15 (1945); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
21 See supra cases cited at note 20.
" The Supreme Court laid down the general rule in Colgate, holding that "Mr' the absence of
any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman Act) does not restrict the long
recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal." Colgate, 250 U.S. at
307. This general right of a private business concern to exercise freely its own independent
discretion as to with whom it will deal is known as the Colgate doctrine and it remains the general
rule governing unilateral refusals to deal. Annotation, 41 A.L.R. FED. at 185-86, 196. Thus, the
federal courts have often stated that a unilateral refusal to deal, in and of itself, without more, does
not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act. See, e.g., Daily Press, Inc. v. United Press Intl, 412
F.2d 126, 134-35 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 990 (1969); Standard Oil Co. v. Moore, 251 F.2d
188, 211 (9th Cir. 1957), cm. denied, 356 U.S. 975 (1958); Unibrand Tire & Product Co. v. Armstrong
Rubber Co., 429 F. Supp. 470, 474 (W.D.N.Y. 1977). The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the
doctrine in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984) (under section 1 of the
Sherman Act, a "manufacturer of course generally has a right to deal, or to refuse to deal, with
whomever it likes, so long as it does so independently").
The sharp contrast between the harsh treatment accorded concerted refusals to deal and the
presumption of propriety given unilateral refusals reflects the basic distinction.in the Sherman Act
between concerted and independent action. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767; Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761.
While all concerted activity is judged sternly, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of single
firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 768. The Copperweld
Court continued:
It is not enough that a single firm appears to "restrain trade" unreasonably, for even
a vigorous competitor may leave that impression. For instance, an efficient firm may
capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival, whose own ability to compete
may suffer as a result. This is the rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of
competition that promotes the consumer interests that the Sherman Act aims to foster.
In part because it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust competition from conduct
with long-run anticompetitive effects, Congress authorized Sherman Act scrutiny of
single firms only when they pose a danger of monopolization. Judging unilateral
conduct in this manner reduces the risk that the antitrust laws will dampen the zeal
of a single aggressive entrepreneur.
Id. at 767-68 (footnote omitted).
2'
	
a section 2 action, "the plaintiff must show that the defendant's acts unnecessarily excluded
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to deal is illegal under the Act only when it embodies or produces an unreasonable
restraint of trade,24 the purposeful elimination of competition," or the creation of a
monopoly through conduct not honestly industria1. 28 In determining whether a unilateral
refusal to deal violates section 2, the courts have applied a two-pronged test focusing on
market power and anticompetitive intent. 27
In United States v. Grinnell Corp., 28 decided in 1966, the United States Supreme Court
set forth the current formulation of this two-part test to distinguish legitimate competitive
practices from unreasonably exclusionary conduct violative of section 2.29 Consequently,
this is the test by which the legality of unilateral refusals to deal is measured." The
Grinnell Court stated that in order to establish a prima facie monopolization offense
under section 2 of the Sherman Act, the plaintiff must show:
1) possession of monopoly power in the relevant market [by the putative
monopolist]; and 2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power [by
the putative monopolist], as distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident."
Thus, the test requires proof of two distinct elements: monopoly power and an intent
or purpose to monopolize."
The first element requires evidence that the alleged monopolist possessed the power
to control prices or exclude competition in the relevant market." The second element
of the test requires evidence supporting an inference that anticompetitive animus mo-
tivated the monopolist's challenged conduct.34 The Court has long held, however, that
competition from the relevant market." Ca/comp, 613 F.2d at 735; Greyhound Computer Corp. v.
International Business Mach. Corp., 559 F.2d 488, 498 (9th Cir. 1977). See Daily Press, 412 F.2d at
134-35 (citing United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 32 (1959); Lorain Journal v. United
States, 342 U.S. 143, 154 (1951); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211,
213 (1951); Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307). See also 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 4 736.
24See, e.g., Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 29; Kiefer-Stewart, 340 U.S. at 213.
25 See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154.
26 See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials, Co., 273 U.S. 359, 368-69, 375
(1927).
27 See, e.g., Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71; Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
23 384 U.S. 563 (1966). In Grinnell, the federal government brought suit against the Grinnell
Corporation and its affiliated companies, alleging that it had illegally monopolized the market for
accredited central station protection services (burglar alarm, fire alarm, sprinkler supervision, and
watch signal services) in violation of section 2. Id. at 566-67. The Court held that the offense of
monopolization under section 2 of the Act required proof that the defendant possessed monopoly
power in the relevant market and that it acquired or maintained that power in pursuit of a purpose
to monopolize. Id. at 570-71. Finding that Grinnell's practices, including restrictive marketing
agreements, predatory pricing arrangements, and acquisition of competitors, evidenced an illegal
intent to monopolize the relevant market, the Court held that the second prong of the monopoli-
zation test was satisfied. Id. at 571.
22 Id. at 570-71.
20 Unilateral conduct, by its very nature, may only be challenged under § 2 of the Act. Copper-
weld, 467 U.S. at 768. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
31
 Grinned, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
32 Id. This casenote refers to this two-pronged test alternately as the "Grinnell test" or the
"monopoly power plus intent" test of monopolization. The elements of the test are, however, evident
in much earlier cases brought under § 2 of the Act. See, e.g., Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 375; Colgate,
250 U.S. at 307.
ss Id. at 571. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
34 Id.
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the putative monopolist may rebut the elements of the Grinnell test by demonstrating
that it does not possess monopoly power in the relevant product and geographic markets,
or that legitimate business purposes, rather than an intent to monopolize, motivated its
conduct. 35
Typically, the defendant monopolist in a refusal to deal case is a vertically integrated
business enterprise," often in possession of materials or facilities vital to the productive
processes and operations of its competitors." In these cases, the courts as a rule have
found section 2 violations where, in refusing to sell its smaller competitors the input
factors necessary for them to furnish their services, manufacture their products, or
operate their businesses, the monopolist's conduct created an inference of the monop-
olist's intent or purpose to monopolize by excluding its competitors.
In only one case prior to 1985 had the Court applied the Grinnell test to a section
2 monopolization claim where no vertical customer-seller relationship existed between
the adversary parties. In that case, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States," decided in 1951,
a newspaper which was indispensable to local businesses refused to sell advertising space
to customers who bought advertising on a local radio station." The Court found both
that the Journal possessed monopoly power in the relevant market and that its conduct
was designed to destroy the competitor.40 Accordingly, the Court enjoined the monop-
olist's conduct as an illegal attempt to monopolize, having as its purpose exclusion of the
competing radio station through means beyond competition on the merits.'" Thus, prior
to 1985, the Court had applied the Grinnell test to unilateral refusals to deal arising only
in two general factual contexts those cases in which termination of a vertical customer-
seller relationship was at issue, 42 and the situation in Lorain Journal, where a monopolist
refused to deal with those who dealt with its competitor."
In 1985, however, in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 44 the Supreme
Court for the first time addressed the question of whether an unintegrated monopolist's
55 Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 608-10 (1985), (Aspen).
See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 381-82 (1973); Lorain Journal, 342
U.S. at 155; Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 375 (by implication); Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307; Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 718 F.2d 1509, 1519 (10th Cir. 1989), (Aspen 1), aff 'd, 472
U.S. 585, 611 (1985); Byars, 609 F.2d at 862-63 & n.53; Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit and
Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 487-88 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
96 A vertically integrated firm is one that operates at more than one level or stage in the
production of the same product, such that the firm through its separate divisions and activities
stands in a supplier-customer relationship to itself. United States Steel, 251 U.S. at 438. See also 3
AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2,11723.
These are the cases to which the so-called "essential facilities doctrine" or "bottleneck" theory
is applicable. See, e,g., Aspen!, 738 F.2d at 1520-21; Byars, 609 F.2d at 856. For a detailed discussion
of the doctrine and its application in refusal to deal cases, see infra notes 108-116 and accompanying
text.
m 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
39 Id. at 148-49.
40 1d. at 152-55.
41 Id. at 153-54.
42 These cases are discussed infra notes 92-116 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
44 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
45 An unintegrated monopolist is a firm which operates only in the market in which it holds
monopoly power, as distinguished from a vertically integrated firm, which operates at more than
one level of production of a product. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, 11723.
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unilateral refusal to continue a cooperative marketing arrangement with a horizontal"
competitor could constitute unlawful monopolization in violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act. A unanimous Court, applying the two-pronged Grinnell test, held that the
defendant monopolist's refusal to cooperate with its rival in offering a joint ski lift ticket
was indeed conduct prohibited by section 2 of the Sherman Act. 47
The dispute in Aspen arose when Aspen Skiing Co. (Ski Co.), which owns three of
the four ski mountains in the Aspen, Colorado area, discontinued its participation in an
interchangeable ski lift ticket with Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. (Highlands), owner of
the fourth ski mountain at Aspen." In most years from 1962 through 1978, the two
competitors offered their customers a joint ticket useable on all four mountains. 49 When,
contrary to Highlands' wishes, Ski Co. refused to continue the cooperative arrangement
for the 1978-1979 season, Highlands' share of the market for downhill skiing at Aspen
declined substantially." Highlands then filed suit alleging that by refusing to offer the
joint ticket, Ski Co. had monopolized the market for downhill skiing at Aspen in violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act. 5 I
At trial, the jury found that Highlands proved the two elements of monopolization
as required under the district court's Grinnell instruction and returned a verdict for
damages against Ski Co. 52 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that
the evidence was sufficient for a jury to infer that Ski Co.'s intent in refusing to market
the four area ticket was to create or maintain a monopoly." The Tenth Circuit also held
that the ability to offer its customers access to Ski Co.'s larger facilities was essential to
Highlands' ability to compete effectively." 4
 Consequently, the appeals court held, Ski Co.
had an affirmative duty to make its facilities available to Highlands."
In response to the Tenth Circuit's judgment, Ski Co. obtained a writ of certiorari
to the United States Supreme Court." Writing for a unanimous Court, 57 Justice Stevens
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's holding that Ski Co.'s refusal to cooperate with Highlands
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act. 5 "
The Court held that even though a firm with monopoly power has no general duty
to engage in a joint marketing program with a competitor, the firm may nevertheless be
subject to section 2 liability where its refusal to continue a joint venture gives rise to
inferences of anticompetitive intent and is unsupported by valid business justifications."
46 The economic relationship between companies performing similar functions in the produc-
tion or sale of comparable goods or services is characterized as "horizontal." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S.
at 334. The Court distinguishes such relationships from those between firms standing in a supplier-
customer relationship, which are characterized as "vertical." Id. at 323. Where, as in Aspen, 472 U.S.
585, two firms operate in the same market, that is, at the same level of production, and operate
only at that level, the firms are "unintegrated horizontal competitors." Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323.
47 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610-11.
45 Id. at 593-95.
49 Id. at 589-92.
5° Id. at 594-95.
• Id. at 592-95.
52 Id. at 595-97.
55 Id. at 599.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56
 469 U.S. 1071 (1984).
• Justice  White took no part in the decision of this case. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611.
52 Id. at 610-11.
59 Id, at 600-01.
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The Court emphasized that a monopolist's intent, as inferred from its conduct and from
the general circumstances of the case, is critical in determining whether the challenged
conduct is fairly characterized as exclusionary, anticompetitive, or predatory.° Citing
evidence of Ski Co.'s past pattern of dealing with Highlands,61 the fifteen-year history
of the cooperative venture,62 the adverse impact of Ski Co.'s conduct on both Highlands
and consumer welfare, 63 and the lack of an ordinary business purpose or efficiency
justification to legitimate Ski Co.'s decision to discontinue the joint ticket, 64 the Court
held that the record was sufficient for the jury to find Ski Co.'s refusal to deal with
Highlands unlawfully exclusionary. 65 In determining that the evidence was sufficient to
support the verdict of unlawful monopolization based on Ski Co.'s intent alone, the
Court found it unnecessary to consider the possible relevance of the essential facilities
doctrine.°
00 1d. at 602-04.
el As illuminative of Ski Co.'s monopolistic intent, the Court noted that in this case "the
monopolist did not merely reject a novel offer to participate in a cooperative venture that had been
proposed by a competitor. Rather, the monopolist elected to make an important change in a pattern
of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted for several years." Id.
at 603.
62 Id.
63 1d. at 606-08, Ski Co. argued that it should not be required to demonstrate that its conduct
was supported by an affirmative business justification, because its "undisputed desire to compete
with Highlands rather than help it through cooperation" was alone sufficient evidence of the pro-
competitive character of its conduct. Brief of Petitioner at 20. Ski Co. did, nonetheless, advance
several justifications for its conduct at trial, but was unable to persuade the jury that its conduct
was justified by a normal business purpose. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-10. Ski Co. proffered six
justifications for terminating the joint ticket: (I) the joint ticket was the product of a voluntary,
bilateral agreement which Ski Co. was perfectly justified in terminating when it perceived that the
agreement was more beneficial to Highlands than to itself; (2) the joint ticket, operating as it did
to increase Highlands' market share above the level it would have achieved in the absence of the
cooperative venture, distorted the efficient resource allocation of the competitive free-market sys-
tem; (3) the arrangement produced an "unacceptable free-rider problem," with Highlands taking
advantage of Ski Co.'s national advertising campaign and siphoning off revenues that Ski Co. could
recapture if the ticket was discontinued; (4) use of the jointly offered ticket could not be monitored
properly; (5) the coupons (in use from 1962 to the 1971-1972 ski season) were administratively
cumbersome, and the survey method of revenue allocation was inaccurate and disruptive; and (6)
Ski Co. desired to disassociate itself from what it considered the inferior skiing services offered at
Highlands. Id. See also Brief of Petitioner at 20-28.
" The Court emphasized the convenience and flexibility of the six-day ticket because it elimi-
nated the need for skiers to wait in line for an individual one-day ticket each morning, expanded
the variety of ski terrain skiers could access'with the same ticket, and allowed purchasers to decide
in their own time and for their own reasons which mountain to ski on each day. id. at 608.
65 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610-11. The trial court instructed the jury that to find conduct exclusion-
ary, it must draw a distinction "between practices which tend to exclude or restrict competition on
the one hand, and the success of a business which reflects only a superior product, a well-run
business, or luck on the other." Id. at 604. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. Citing 3
AREEDA & 'TURNER, supra note 2, [116264 the Court noted that "'exclusionary' comprehends at the
most behavior that not only (1) tends to impair the opportunities of rivals, but also (2) either does
not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way." Aspen, 472
U.S. at 605 n.32.
56 Id. at 611 n.44. The Tenth Circuit discussed at length the applicability of the essential facilities
doctrine to this case. See Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1520-21. The Supreme Court, however, agreed with
Highlands that "given the evidence in the record, it is not necessary to rely on the essential facilities
doctrine in order to affirm the judgment." Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600.
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In holding an unintegrated monopolist's unilateral refusal to enter into a cooperative
marketing arrangement with its horizontal competitor unlawful, the Supreme Court's
decision in Aspen is at odds with the procompetitive purposes and goals of the Sherman
Act.67 In Aspen, the Court for the first time held that a monopolist's refusal to deal
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act where the challenged conduct neither impeded
its rival's ability to bring its services to market, distorted free choice in the marketplace,
nor otherwise obstructed the process of competition on the merits. The Grinnell "mo-
nopoly power plus intent to monopolize" standard of liability for section 2 violations68
in past refusal to deal cases successfully distinguished unnecessarily exclusionary conduct,
which the Act intends to prohibit," from legitimate conduct which represents and
furthers competition on the merits. Yet the Grinnell standard's failure to examine directly
the nature of the monopolist's challenged conduct led the Court in Aspen to condemn
legitimate industrial behavior which actually furthered competition on the merits. The
Aspen decision in effect proscribes a dominant firm from competing vigorously on the
merits with its smaller competitor where the two firms have a history of cooperation.
The decision, furthermore, has severe implications respecting a private firm's autonomy
and its commonly presupposed right to enter into only those business agreements it
deems advantageous."
This casenote begins by discussing the background and development of the standard
of liability for unilateral refusals to deal under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The
discussion focuses on the factual situations the Court confronted in cases prior to Aspen
and the result obtained in those cases upon applying the Grinnell "monopoly power plus
intent" test to determine whether section 2 had been violated. Section two of the casenote
presents the Aspen decision, describing the unanimous Court's approach and reasoning.
Section three then evaluates the merit and effect of the Court's application of the Grinnell
test to the situation in Aspen, emphasizing the factual dissimilarities between Aspen and
the prior refusal to deal cases to which the Court has applied the test.
Finally, section four proposes that a conduct-oriented test of liability which examines
the nature and competitive impact of the challenged conduct, rather than the more
subjective "intent" standard of Grinnell would more effectively enforce the purposes and
policy objectives underlying the Sherman Act in refusal to deal cases. A unilateral refusal
to deal should not be held to violate section 2 of the Sherman Act absent a nexus between
the antitrust defendant's monopoly power and the challenged conduct, 7 ' and absent
conduct which deprives the rival plaintiff of materials or resources necessary for it to
carry on its business or which interferes with the rival's ability to compete with the
monopolist on the merits. Explicit recognition of the need to prove "nexus" and "im-
paired competition" would provide the courts with a more objective standard on which
67 See infra notes 285-303 and accompanying text.
" Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71.
69 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
7° See infra notes 304-334 and accompanying text.
71
 This is the "nexus" test discussed infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text. While this
essential link between the defendant's monopoly power and its challenged conduct was present in
Aspen, see infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text, the Court did not make an express finding to
that effect. This casenote proposes that proof of existence of a nexus between monopoly power
and the challenged conduct should be explicitly required in section 2 cases, such that only conduct
which constitutes an actual misuse of monopoly power is penalized. See infra notes 289-98 and
accompanying text.
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to adjudge anticompetitive conduct and enable them to better effectuate the goals and
purposes which underlie the Sherman Act.
1. BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY FOR REFUSAL TO DEAL UNDER SECTION
2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it a felony to monopolize, attempt to monop-
olize, or conspire to monopolize "any part of the trade or commerce among the several
states, or with foreign nations .. "72 The Act, along with the Clayton Act" passed in
1914, provides criminal and civil remedies for antitrust law violations." Persons who are
injured in their business or property by practices violative of the antitrust laws may bring
suit under the Act and recover threefold the damages they sustain." The Act also
provides the United States and each of the states through its Attorney General a right
of action for antitrust violations." While it is clear that all instances of monopoly are not
illegal" and unilateral refusals to deal by a monopolist are generally permissible,"
exceptions to the general rule are numerous." Where a monopolist's refusal to deal with
a competitor evinces a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, such conduct may
constitute unlawful monopolization or an unlawful attempt to monopolize in violation
of section 2 of the Act."
In applying section 2 to a monopolist's alleged refusal to deal, the courts have long
employed the Grinnell two-pronged test to determine whether a plaintiff has made a
prima facie showing of the monopolization offense.01 Courts have read the test as
requiring the antitrust plaintiff to prove that the defendant monopolist possessed mo-
78 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73
 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1982).
74 Clayton Act section 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), superseded Sherman Act section 7, 15 U.S.C.
§ 7 (1952), providing for private treble damage actions. The Clayton Act's remedial provisions,
through Clayton Act section 1, incorporate the Sherman Act by reference. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1982).
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for private treble damage actions and criminal actions by
both the federal government and the states through their Attorneys General for violations of the
antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
" 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982).
743 Id .
77 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., cases cited infra at notes 91-125.
"See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 155 (The Sherman Act prohibits a monopolist's exercise
of the "right" to accept advertisements from whomever it pleases, as a purposeful means of
monopolizing interstate commerce); Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 375 (monopolist's refusal to deal
illegal where motivated by policy in pursuance of a purpose to monopolize"); Colgate, 250 U.S. at
307 (Tin the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the Act does not restrict
the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business freely
to exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal."). See also Otter
Tad, 410 U.S. at 377; United States v. Terminal R. Ass'n, 224 U.S. 383, 401 (1912); MCI Com-
munications v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1106-08 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
891 (1983); Mid-Texas Communication Systems v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 615 F.2d 1372, 1387 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Byars v. Bluff City News Co., 609 F.2d 843, 860 (6th Cir.
1979); Six Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v. Rollings Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 482 (5th Cir.
1966); Package Programs, Inc. v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Sys., 255 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 1958).
81 The Court first formulated the test in its present form in Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71. The
Grinnell test is quoted supra note 31 and accompanying text.
426	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 28:415
nopoly power in the relevant market and intended by its conduct to monopolize or
exclude competition in that market. 82 The first element of the test requires that the
plaintiff establish the relevant geographic and product markets in which the defendant
is alleged to wield monopoly power." The plaintiff also must establish that the defendant
indeed possessed the power to control prices or exclude competition in the relevant
market. 84 Such power ordinarily may be inferred from the defendant's possession of a
predominant share of the market."
The second element of the test, whether the challenged conduct represents the
willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, necessitates an inquiry into the
nature of the monopolist's conduct." Under Grinnell, the determinative question under
this element is whether the challenged conduct and the surrounding circumstances are
sufficient to raise an inference of monopolistic intent or purpose on the part of the
monopolist."
The Supreme Court, however, adheres to the monopoly power plus intent standard
it announced in Grinnell and thus shuns direct examination of conduct in its section 2
analysis." Many courts have, however, in effect read the Grinnell test as requiring proof
of a third element in order to make out a case for illegal monopolization. These courts
have implicitly required a plaintiff to show that the defendant has unlawfully used its
monopoly power." This reading of Grinnell requires that an antitrust plaintiff prove not
82 See Byars, 609 F.2d at 853. See also supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
" Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571. For detailed discussion of this requirement and the problems of
market definition, see id. at 571-76; Byars, 609 F.2d at 849-53; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 424-28. This
first element required under Grinnell to establish a section 2 violation was not at issue in Aspen
either on appeal in the Tenth Circuit or before the Supreme Court. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 596;
Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1509 n.12.
84 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571; United States v. DuPont & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956); American
Tobacco, 147 F.2d at 112, aff 'd, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
"s
	 384 U.S. at 571; Byars, 609 F.2d at 850-51 and examples cited at id. n.18. Deter-
mination of the relevant market is a question of fact. Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1514 n.4.
86 384 U.S. at 576. The necessary inquiry under the second prong of the Grinnell test
is whether the challenged acts unnecessarily exclude competition. Calcomp, 613 F.2d at 735. The
Calcomp court interpreted the second prong of the Grinnell test as requiring proof of "predatory or
anticompetitive conduct," rather than simply a showing of monopolistic intent. Id. at 737. See also
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276; Greyhound Computer, 559 F.2d at 498.
" See, e.g., Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605-11; Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377; Mid-Texas Communications, 615
F.2d at 1387-89; Byars, 609 F.2d at 853; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274-76. See also United States v.
Griffith, 334 U.S. 100,107-08 (1948); Smith-Kline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056,1065
(3d Cir.) (A monopolist may not arbitrarily or invidiously we its monopoly power in one market,
even if lawfully obtained, to harm competition in another market) (emphasis added), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 838 (1978).
Courts frequently have noted the importance of considering the challenged conduct in the
context of the monopolist's other actions to determine whether there in fact existed an "intent to
monopolize" on the part of the monopolist. See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 152 ("The sur-
rounding circumstances [of the conduct of the monopolist] are important."); Mid-Texas Communi-
cations, 615 F.2d at 1389 ("as a general principle, section 2 prohibits only those refusals to deal
which under the particular circumstances of a case are unreasonably anticompetitive."); Byars, 609
F.2d at 860,863 ("In a § 2 case, only a thorough analysis of each fact situation will reveal whether
the monopolist's conduct is unreasonably anticompetitive and thus unlawful .... Each case must
necessarily turn on its own facts."). See also Calcomp, 615 F.2d at 735-38; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at
276-78; Greyhound Computer, 559 F.2d at 498-503.
48 See, e.g., Aspen, 472 U.S. at 602-05.
" Several of the circuit courts of appeals have recently signalled their adherence to this ap-
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only the defendant's possession and intent to misuse monopoly power, but also that the
defendant's conduct constituted an actual misuse of monopoly power to effectuate its
allegedly anticompetitive purposes." Thus, these courts have implicitly imposed upon
antitrust plaintiffs the additional requirement of proving a "nexus" between the defen-
dant's monopoly power and its allegedly illegal conduct motivated by an intent to mo-
nopolize.
A. The Factual Parameters of Prior Refusal to Deal Cases
Prior to Aspen, all unilateral refusals to deal that gave rise to the inference of
anticompetitive intent required under section 2 fell into four categories, based upon the
nature of the conduct involved and the factual contexts• in which the respective refusals
to deal took place." , The first generally recognized refusal to deal situation is where a
monopolist uses its monopoly power in one market to distort competition in another
market by refusing to dea1. 92 Such violations typically involve the refusal of a firm
wielding monopoly power in one market to sell to" or to buy from'" a firm against which
the monopolist competes in another market. On several occasions courts have held such
practices illegal as exclusionary conduct undertaken in pursuance of a purpose to mo-
nopolize." Thus, in Poster Exchange, Inc. v. Nat'l Screen Service Corp.," the Fifth Circuit
proach. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d at 860 ("lw'hat should matter is not the monopolist's state of mind,
but the overall impact of the monopolist's practices. As preservation of competition is at the heart
of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, a practice should be deemed 'unfair' or 'predatory' only if' it is
unreasonably anticompetitive.") (citation omitted); Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 276 ("It is the use of
economic power that creates the liability."). See also MCI, 708 F.2d at 1108 n.35; Telex, 510 F.2d at
926-28.
9" See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d at 853 (finding that a violation of section 2 by refusal to deal requires
proof of' "abuse of monopoly power") (emphasis in original).
91 Byars, 609 F.2d at 857-58.
n See, e.g., Home Placement Serv. v. Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d 274, 281 (1982) (mo-
nopolist newspaper publisher's use of its dominance in the newspaper advertising market to fore-
close competition in the housing vacancy market by refusing to purchase from the plaintiff pro-
spective advertiser listings of housing rental information); Six Twenty-Nine Productions, Inc. v.
Rollins Telecasting, Inc., 365 F.2d 478, 483 (5th Cir. 1966) (issue existed as to whether refusal of
a local television station to pay the normal commission for material prepared by the plaintiff
advertising agency violated section 2 where the defendant television station operated an advertising
agency which competed with the plaintiff); Packaged Programs, 255 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 1958)
(cause or action existed under section 2 where a television station refused to deal with a producer
of filmed programs where the television station also competed in the separate market of filming
television shows). Cf. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948) (film monopolist illegally
attempted to use its monopoly power in one geographic market to obtain monopoly in another
geographic market by negotiating agreements with film distributors to obtain exclusive privileges
to new releases).
93 See Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d at 281 (refusal to sell advertising space).
" See Six Twenty-Nine Productions, 365 F.2d at 486 (refusal to buy packaged advertisements);
Packaged Programs, 255 F.2d at 710 (refusal to buy television programming).
" Providence Journal Co., 682 F.2d at 281; Six Twenty-Nine Productions, 365 F.2d at 485-86;
Packaged Programs, 255 F.2d at 710 (question existed as to "monopolistic designs" of the defendant).
Cf. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 291 (A Sherman Act defendant "is not liable under § 2 for the actions
described fintroduction of new camera design simultaneous with introduction of new film format]
unless it gained a competitive advantage in these markets by use of the monopoly power it possessed
in other segments of the industry.").
9" 431 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971).
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held that National Screen, a monopolist in the manufacture and wholesale supply of
promotional movie posters, violated section 2 by refusing to sell wholesale stock to Poster
Exchange, a distributor of the posters.° The court held that because National Screen
intentionally used its monopoly power at the manufacturing level to eliminate Poster
Exchange as a competitor at the distributor-jobber level, its refusal to deal was illegal
monopolization in violation of section 2. 98 Thus, section 2 prohibits a monopolist's
predatory leveraging of its monopoly power in one market to gain power in another
geographic market or product market, absent a valid business justification for the refusal
to deal 9`' When, however, a monopolist's refusal to deal results in discontinuation or
curtailment of competition in another market where the monopolist does not compete, such
conduct does not violate the antitrust laws.m
The second situation in which courts have found that refusals to deal violate section
2 of the Sherman Act is when a monopolist seeking to vertically integrate refuses to deal
in order to effect the integration.m A monopolist's refusal to sell materials or products
over which it exercises monopoly control to a firm in a vertically adjacent market 192 in
which the monopolist also competes or desires to compete may be sufficient, considered
in the context of the other evidence, to give rise to an inference of unlawful intent to
monopolize. 195 Thus, in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials the Supreme
Court held unlawful Kodak's refusal to deal with Southern Photo, one of its retail
distributors, because Kodak refused to deal in order to vertically integrate into the retail
distribution of photography supplies. 108 The cases which fit this factual construct all
involve attempts by monopolists in one market to distort competition in another market
or to establish a monopoly for themselves in that second market. 106 Such practices clearly
97 Id. at 338-40.
99 Id. at 339-40.
" The "valid business justification" defense to an alleged illegal refusal to deal is discussed
infra, notes 126-36, and accompanying text.
""' Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 630 F.2d 920,925-26 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
L°' See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377 (power company unlawfully used its monopoly power in
the wholesale power generation market to prevent the displacement of its monopoly power in the
local retail power market by refusing to sell wholesale power to municipalities who proposed to
start their own retail power systems); Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 369 (monopolist in wholesale
photography supplies cut off one of its retail distributors as part of its efforts to vertically integrate
into the retail distribution of photography supplies); Byars, 609 F.2d at 848-50 (regional wholesaler
of newspapers and magazines illegally used monopoly power to cut off small local distributor of
periodicals where wholesaler also competed in local distribution market); Poster Exchange, 431 F.2d
at 338-40 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 912 (1971) (monopolist in the wholesale supply of
promotional movie posters violated section 2 where it refused to deal with retail distributor of
posters against whom the monopolist also competed in the retail distribution market); United States
v. Kleerflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32,40-42 (0. Minn. 1945) (sole manufacturer of linen
rug material illegally used monopoly power in refusing to sell material to a distributor to prevent
distributor from bidding on government contracts on which the monopolist also bid).
LOS Thus, in these cases, the firms alleging injury occupy the positions of both competitor and
customer vis-a-vis the monopolist. See, e.g., Byars, 609 F.2d at 848.
LOS See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377-78; Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 375; Byars, 609 F.2d at 855-
61; Poster Exchange, 431 F.2d at 339-40; Kleerflax, 63 F. Supp. at 41.
104 273 U.S. 359.
los Id. at 375.
106 This "intermarket leveraging" was also present in Lorain Journal, where the monopolist
newspaper publisher attempted to use its monopoly in the local newspaper market to exclude
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represent something more than competition on the merits, and thus fulfill the "willful
acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power" requirement of section 2's prohibitions.
The third class of conduct generally found to constitute an illegal refusal to deal is
where a business or a group of competitorsm 7
 controls a facility or resource that is
essential to competitive viability in the marketplace and that business or group refuses
to sell the resource or grant access to the facility to competitors)" In these cases, the
vertically integrated monopolist refuses to deal an essential, non-replicable supply factor,
necessary to a competitor's production processes, to that competitor on non-discrimi-
natory terms. 1 °9
 The so-called "essential facilities" analysis is exemplified by the Supreme
Court's 1912 decision in United States v. Terminal Railroad Assoc."° In Terminal Railroad,
the Court held that the refusal of a group of railway companies to allow competing
railroad operators access to the terminal facilities at St. Louis, Missouri, constituted an
illegal refusal to deal in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act." The Court stressed
the essential and unique nature of the terminal facilities, the defendants' exclusive control
of the facilities, the virtual impossibility of competitors' duplicating the facilities, and the
indispensability of the facilities to railway line operators." 2
Because liability in these cases is founded upon the monopolist's denial of use of an
essential facility to a competitor, the test requires both that the monopolist be a competitor
competition in the local radio market. Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. 143. See infra notes 117-21 and
accompanying text. While Lorain Journal involves the use of monopoly power to affect competition
in a horizontal market, rather than in a vertical market where the monopolist and the injured rival
stand in a supplier-customer relationship in addition to their status as competitors, the nature of
the conduct is the same. In both the Lorain Journal and Southern Photo situations, the monopolist
used its monopoly power in one market to distort competition in another market.
1°7
 Indeed, most of the cases involving the essential facilities doctrine have concerned concerted,
as opposed to unilateral, action. See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. I, 3-5 (1945)
(members of cooperative news gathering agency whose services were vital to the success of a
newspaper refused to furnish news to non-members and imposed large financial burdens on a
member's competitor seeking membership); Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 410-11 (combination of
railroad companies which exercised exclusive ownership and control over all of the railway terminal
facilities at St. Louis, Missouri, effectively controlling the only reasonable means of access to that
city, illegally denied competitors use or access to those facilities); Gamco, 194 F.2d at 486 (fruit
wholesalers who jointly own a warehouse may not exclude competing wholesaler, absent some
justification). Concerted action of this type, of course, is also subject to attack under section 1 of
the Act.
108 Byars, 609 F.2d at 856 & n.34 ("Under this approach, a business or group of businesses
which controls a scarce facility has an obligation to give competitors reasonable access to it."). See
also Aspen 1, 738 F.2d at 1520-21 (Ski Co.'s refusal to market a multi-day, multi-mountain ticket
with Highlands constituted the denial of an essential facility to a competitor by a monopolist); MCI,
708 F.2d at 1133 (where competing defendant communications system controlled access to the
communications facility essential to operation of its competitor, essential facilities doctrine appli-
cable). Cf. Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 153 (fact that the Journal was an "indispensable medium of
advertising for many Lorain concerns" weighed heavily in Court's decision).
105
 See Aspen 1, 738 F.2d at 1519; Byars, 609 F.2d at 858. The courts have identified four
elements which are necessary to establish a monopolist's liability for a unilateral refusal to deal
under the essential facilities approach: (1) control of the essential facility by the monopolist; (2) a
competitor's inability to duplicate the facility; (3) denial of the use of the facility to a competitor;
and (4) the feasibility of providing the facilities. Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1520; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-
33.
224 U.S. 383 (1912).
In Id. at 394-406,411.
112 Id. at 397-400.
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of the putative buyer and that the monopolist control an essential supply or facility
necessary for the buyer to carry on its business."3 Such a situation, therefore, most often
arises where a vertically integrated monopolist is involved. 114 The rationale for holding
illegal a monopolist's refusal to allow its competitors reasonable access to essential facilities
it controls, on non-discriminatory terms,"' is clear; by withholding the facility, the
monopolist intentionally interferes with the ability of its competitor to continue its
business and bring its product to market, thereby severely crippling the rival's oppor-
tunity to compete on the merits." 6
Finally, courts have held refusals to deal violative of section 2 where a monopolist
refuses to deal with those who deal with its competitors. 17 In Lorain journal, for example,
the Journal was a daily newspaper that reached an estimated 99% of Lorain, Ohio families
in the late 1940's and early 1950's." As such, businesses in the Lorain area considered
the Journal an indispensable means of advertising."9 The Court found the Journal's
refusal to sell advertising space to merchants who also purchased advertising time from
a competing radio station an attempt to monopolize in violation of section 2.'" The
Court held that the Journal's conduct clearly evinced a purpose to destroy the radio
station, and enjoined the conduct as an illegal attempt to monopolize interstate commerce
under section 2.' 2 ' Refusal to deal with those who deal with competitors is inherently
anticompetitive because it requires a monopolist to turn away business and incur either
"3 Aspen 1, 738 F.2d at 1520; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
"4 This is both the logical and empirical result. See Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 77-79; Southern Photo,
273 U.S. at 368; Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 391-94; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132-33.
115 Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 410-11; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1132; Byars, 609 F.2d at 856.
16 While the essential facilities decisions appear to focus on the detrimental effect of the
challenged conduct on competitors, rather than on the monopolist's state of mind as in the other
refusal to deal contexts, it is clear that these cases must also satisfy the second element of the
Grinnell test. Generally, however, the overall conduct of a monopolist in refusing to make an essential
facility available to a competitor provides plain evidence that it was seeking to destroy the rival. In
refusing to deal an essential Facility to a competitor, a monopolist by definition turns away business,
and thus current revenues, presumably in exchange for the benefits of long run monopoly. Otter
Tail, 410 U.S. at 377; Byars, 609 F.2d at 856-57. In direct contrast, the monopolist's conduct in
Aspen did not require that it turn away eager customers as in the true essential facilities cases. In
refusing to continue the joint ticket arrangement with Highlands, Ski Co. did not forego current
revenues by turning away sales. Rather, by discontinuing the all-Aspen ticket Ski Co. hoped to
increase current sales by winning customers from its rival, Highlands. See Brief of Petitioner at 29.
See also supra note 8a and accompanying text. On the so-called "overlap" between the essential
facilities doctrine and the "intent theory," see Byars, 609 F.2d at 856-57.
17 See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154 (monopolist newspaper's refusal to sell advertising
space to merchants who also purchased advertising time from a competing radio station violated
section 2); Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643,661 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S.
923 (1957) (media company which owned only television station, a radio station, and a major daily
morning and evening newspaper in Kansas City market violated section 2 where it used its monopoly
power to increase its newspaper advertising by refusing to sell to advertisers who did not agree to
advertise in the company's two newspapers). Kansas City Star might also be classified in category
one, supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text. There, the media monopolist used its monopoly
power in one market (television) to distort competition in another market (newspapers) by refusing
to deal with potential television advertisers who would not also purchase advertisements in the
monopolist's newspapers. See Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 648-49.
"" Lorain Journal, 324 U.S. at 146.
' 0 Id. at 152.
129 Id. at 154-55.
12' Id.
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short-run losses or reductions in profits. 122
 Further, such conduct can only rationally be
designed to destroy competition, through use of means beyond competition on the
merits.'" Where a monopolist refuses to deal with those who deal with its competitors,
its conduct makes a mockery of competition on the merits. Conduct of this type consti-
tutes the monopolist's direct use of its economic might to coerce customers' choice. Thus,
it destroys potential customers' ability to choose freely among all the sellers in a market
based solely on their respective merits. Such conduct certainly supports an inference
that it was motivated by an intent to destroy competition.' 24
 This type of conduct,
therefore, constitutes illegal monopolization in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.' 23
B. Defenses to Monopolists' Alleged Refusals to Deal
In any of the four typical refusal to deal situations, a monopolist may rebut evidence
of monopolistic intent by evidence that the monopolist's challenged acts were not exclu-
sionary or driven by anticompetitive motives, but instead were legitimately justifiable
business practices, undertaken in the ordinary course of business in a competitive envi-
ronment.' 26
 Further, a monopolist may defend the existence of its monopoly power on
the basis that it was acquired through conduct which was honestly industrial, such as
manufacture of a superior product, superior marketing techniques, or greater respon-
siveness to consumer demand.' 22 Finally, a monopolist may defend its acquisition or
possession of monopoly power on the grounds that its power is protected by grace of
governmental regulatory authority. Congress and the courts have recognized that in
sonic instances monopoly power may actually serve the public interest in economic
efficiency, rather than cause it harm. 126 Government regulation of utility companies' 22
122 See L. SULLIVAN, =Pre/ note 2, § 43. See also supra note 8.
121 See Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 15455; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 658.
121 See Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154-55; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 658.
In See Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 662 (defendant's manipulation of its advertisingpolicies to
destroy competitors in the dissemination of news was ample evidence of its attempt to monopolize
the dissemination of news in the Kansas City area).
125 See, e.g., Mid-Texas Communications, 615 F.2d at 1388 ("a monopolist is not liable simply by
iefusing to deal, but may in appropriate situations present valid justifications for its actions");
Cameo, 194 F.2d at 487-88 (denial of access to commercial building would have been justified in
certain situations). See also MCI, 708 F.2d at 1133; Greyhound' Computer, 515 F.2d at 50205; Poster
Exchange, 431 F.2d at 339; Six Twenty-Nine Productions, 365 F.2d at 483; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d
at 657-60.
1"
 This is the "thrust upon" defense, whereby a monopolist innocently acquires its irnonopOly
status merely by operation of its legitimate competitive techniques and virtues. This is the 'cage, for
example, where a firm gains monopoly power by producing a higher quality product than its
competitors or producing it at a lower cost than its competitors. See, e.g., United States v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,391 (1956); Byars, 609 F.2d at 853; Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d
at 273-74; Cameo, 194 F.2d at 487-88; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 429-30.
120 See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1137 ("Ordinarily antitrust liability should not be impbsed when a firm
acts in compliance with its regulatory obligations"). See also United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
Inc., 418 U.S. 602,627 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341,360-61 (1963);
Mid-Texas, 615 F.2d at 1385; Watson & Brunner, Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies"; The Search
for Substantive Standards, 22 ANTITRUST BULL. 559 (1977).
"9 .See MCI, 708 F.2d at 1137; cf. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 373-74; 1 AREEDA & TURNER, 'supra
note 2,11223d.
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and grants of patents"° exemplify government sanctioned monopolies tolerated in the
interests of economic efficiency and the protection of economic incentives to innovate.
Ultimately, the courts must weigh evidence that conduct is legitimately competitive
against evidence that anticompetitive animus or an intent to exclude competition moti-
vated the monopolist's conduct."'
Whether a monopolist has presented evidence sufficient to show that its actions were
not motivated by an intent to monopolize but by valid business reasons is a question for
the trier of fact.'" Thus, in 1983, in Becker v. Egypt News Co.,'" the Eighth Circuit held
that where the distributor of a horse racing publication suspended its dealings with a
retail concessionaire of the publication and the distributor provided evidence of the
retailer's poor past sales performance, the refusal to deal was a valid exercise of the
monopolist's business judgment and thus not unlawful under section 2 of the Sherman
Act."* Similarly, in Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co.,'" the First Circuit in 1981
found the defendant newspaper publisher's decision to become the exclusive distributor
of its own papers valid justification for its refusal to deal with the plaintiff distributor.
Thus, the publisher's conduct did not give rise to liability under the antitrust laws."6
In sum, under the test announced in Grinnell, in deciding the liability of a defendant
for refusal to deal under section 2 of the Sherman Act, courts are only to consider
questions of whether the defendant possessed monopoly power in the relevant market
and whether its conduct evidenced a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. Against
the plaintiff's proof of these elements, the defendant is entitled to offer evidence tending
to disprove that it possesses monopoly power and evidence that the challenged conduct
was motivated by proper competitive purposes. Grinnell does not require direct inquiry
into the competitive nature and effect of the challenged conduct, nor does it explicitly
require a plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct was unreasonably exclusionary.
'" In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., the Court emphasized the public policy interests which
justify the award of monopoly rights through patents:
The stated objective of the Constitution in granting the power to Congress to legislate
in the area of intellectual property is to "promote the Progress of Science and the
useful Arts." [U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cI. 8.] The patent laws promote this progress by
offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk
the often enormous cost in terms of time, research, and development. The productive
effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on society through the introduction
of new products and processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations
by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens.
916 U.S. 470, 980 (1974).
13 ' See, e.g., Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-11; MCI, 708 F.2d at 1137; Byars, 609 F.2d at 862-63.
'2 See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-10. See also Becker v. Egypt News Co., Inc., 713 F.2d 363, 368
(8th Cir. 1983) (distributor of horse racing publication acted in exercise of legitimate business
judgment and thus did not violate section 2 where it provided evidence that its suspension of
dealings with a retail concessionaire of the publication was in response to the retailer's poor past
sales performance); Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 278 (1st Cir. 1981)
(court held defendant newspaper publisher's decision to become the exclusive distributor of its own
papers valid justification for its refusal to deal with plaintiff distributor), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 921
(1982).
1" 713 F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 367-68.
" 5 659 F.2d 273 (1st Or. 1981).
' 36
 Id. at 278.
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Despite its focus on monopolistic intent,'" the Grinnell standard does seek to distin-
guish unreasonably exclusionary conduct from legitimately competitive conduct which
also has the effect of excluding competition." 8
 This intent-oriented test, however, is
incapable in cases like Aspen of making this critical distinction and thus of carrying out
the purposes of the Sherman Act. 198 Before Aspen, the Supreme Court had applied the
Grinnell standard only to distinguish unnecessarily exclusionary conduct from legitimate
conduct grounded in competition on the merits in the four general refusal to deal factual
contexts."8 In Aspen, however, the Court was presented the novel issue of whether the
unilateral refusal of an unintegrated monopolist to participate in a cooperative marketing
arrangement with a horizontal competitor could constitute an abuse of monopoly power
cognizable under section 2 of the Act.
H. ASPEN SKIING CO. V. ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP.
Since the late 1960's, Aspen Skiing Co. has operated three skiing mountains"' near
Aspen, Colorado — Aspen Mountain, 142 Buttermilk,"s and Snowmass. 144
 Since 1958,
Aspen Highlands Skiing Corporation ("Highlands"), has operated another skiing moun-
tain nearby — Aspen Highlands.'"
L3  By requiring only proof of monopoly power and the willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power "as distinguished from growth as a result of [honestly competitive practices]," the Court
focuses on evidence of improper intent or purpose on the part of a monopolist in order to determine
whether the monopolist's conduct is predatory or honestly industrial for section 2 purposes. Grinnell,
384 U.S. at 570-71. See also Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600-11.
In The Supreme Court has accepted this as the principal goal of the Act since the first cases
decided under section 2, see supra note 13 and accompanying text.
l" The Court's use of an intent-oriented test to distinguish legitimate competitive conduct from
illegal exclusionary conduct is critically flawed. The intent of all competitive behavior is to exclude
competition, in so far as a firm's attempt to win customers from its rivals constitutes "exclusion" of
those rivals. See 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, ¶ 626b. See also supra note 14 and accompanying
text. Thus, any test purporting to define exclusionary behavior as that which evidences an "intent
to exclude" competition is ineffective. It is not intent to exclude competition that the Act makes
illegal — if this were indeed the case then all competitive conduct would be illegal — but rather
conduct based on monopoly power which impairs a rival's ability to compete that the Act condemns.
The second prong of the Grinnell test, therefore, because it focuses only on monopolistic intent,
fails to honor the stated purposes of the Sherman Act. See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
14° See supra notes 91-125 and accompanying text.
14 ] Buttermilk Skiing Corporation and Snowmass Skiing Corporation are wholly owned subsid-
iaries of Aspen Skiing Co. Brief of Petitioner at 3, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
142 Ski Co. developed Aspen Mountain in 1946. The runs are steep and primarily designed for
expert or advanced intermediate skiers. The base area of Aspen Mountain is within the village of
Aspen. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 587 n.2.
'43 Development of the Buttermilk Ski area began as an independent project in 1958. Freidl
Pfeiffer, the director of the ski school for Ski Co., and Arthur Pfister planned and developed
Buttermilk primarily for beginner and intermediate skiers, although the area has since developed
more advanced runs. The base area of Buttermilk is approximately two and one quarter miles from
the village of Aspen. In 1964, Ski Co. purchased Buttermilk. Id. at 588 & n.4.
144 Snowmass opened in 1967 and was developed and always operated by Ski Co. Snowmass is
eight miles from the village of Aspen and presents skiers with a well-balanced mixture of beginner,
intermediate and advanced runs. Id. at 588 n.5.
148 Whipple V.N. Jones developed Highlands independently of Ski Co. in 1957. Jones laid out
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Between 1958 and 1964, three independent companies operated Aspen Mountain,
Highlands, and Buttermilk, and each offered its own day or half-day tickets for use of
its mountain. 14" In 1962, however, the three competitors also introduced an interchange-
able ticket.' 47 This six-clay, "all-Aspen" ticket, consisted of a booklet containing six cou-
pons, each redeemable for a daily lift ticket at Aspen Mountain, Highlands, or Buttermilk
during a seven-day period.'" In 1971, the areas replaced the all-Aspen coupon booklets
in favor of an "around the neck" all-Aspen ticket.'"
This refinement in the interchangeable ticket was essentially the same product as its
predecessor but eliminated the daily inconvenience of coupon redemption. With the
refined format, skiers simply presented their tickets to a lift attendant each morning as
they prepared to board the first lift.'" In most seasons after it acquired Buttermilk in
1964, Ski Co. also offered two and three area tickets featuring its mountains only, in
competition with the all-Aspen ticket. 151
Under the system instituted in 1971-1972, Highlands and Ski Co. allocated revenues
from the sale of all-Aspen tickets on the basis of skier usage, as determined by random-
sample surveys of skiers who purchased four-area tickets.' 52 By 1977, multi-area tickets,
including those offered by Ski Co. for its mountains alone, accounted for nearly 35% of
the total market.'" Highlands' share of the revenues from the all-Aspen ticket was 17.5%
in 1973-1974, 18.5% in 1974-1975, 16.8% in 1975-1976, and 13.2% in 1976-1977. 154
For the 1977-1978 season, Ski Co. offered to continue the all-Aspen ticket only if
Highlands would accept a 13.2% fixed share of the tickets' revenues.'" Although 13.2%
had been Highlands' share of the ticket revenues in 1976-1977, Highlands believed that
its poor performance in that year was an aberration due to unfavorable weather.'"
Although it would have preferred to continue to divide revenues on the basis of actual
usage, Highlands eventually accepted a fixed percentage of 15% of all-Aspen ticket
revenues in the 1977-1978 season.'"
During the 1970's, the management of Ski Co. increasingly expressed its dislike for
the all-Aspen ticket.'" Ski Co. management complained that a coupon method of mon-
itoring usage was administratively cumbersome.'" It doubted the accuracy of the survey
method of allocating revenues and complained about the appearance, deportment, and
a fairly balanced set of ski runs: 25% beginner, 50% intermediate, 25% advanced. The base area
of Highlands is one and one half miles from the village of Aspen. Id. at 588 n.3.
Any further development upon most of the suitable skiing terrain in the vicinity of Aspen
requires United States Forest Service approval. Any new• downhill skiing project also requires
approval of the county government. Id. at 588-89.
148 Id. at 589.
' 47 Id.
/413
,49 Id. at 590.
,50 Id.
15 ' Id. at 589.
152 1d. at 590.
Id. at 591.
154 Id. at 590.
' 55 Id. at 591.
155 1d.
• 157
 Id. at 592.
' 58 Id.
169 Id.
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attitude of the individuals employed to conduct the surveys. 160 Ski Co. also believed that
the four-area ticket was siphoning off revenues that it could recapture if the ticket was
discontinued. 161
In March, 1978, Ski Co. management recommended to its Board of Directors that
the four-area ticket be discontinued for the 1978-1979 season. 162
 As a result of this
recommendation, Ski Co. offered Highlands a four-area ticket provided Highlands
would agree to receive an historically low 12.5% fixed percentage of the revenue. 165
Highlands found this proposal unacceptable and, unable to persuade Ski Co. to accept
any of its counter-proposals,'" rejected the offer of the fixed percentage. 165 The areas
offered no all-Aspen ticket for the 1978-1979 season .16.5
Ski Co. took additional steps to break its marketing ties with Highlands. Following
the 1978-1979 season, Ski Co. embarked on a national advertising campaign to promote
its three mountains. 167 These advertisements often depicted Highlands' mountain but
did not refer to the ski area by name.'" Ski Co. also refused to sell to Highlands lift
tickets in bulk for resale by Highlands as a package with Highlands' own tickets. 16v When
Highlands instituted an alternative product, the "Adventure Pack," which consisted of a
three-day pass at Highlands and three vouchers, redeemable with Aspen merchants and
each equal to the value of a daily lift ticket on a Ski Co. mountain, Ski Co. refused to
accept them as payment for Ski Co. tickets."° Later, Highlands redesigned the Adventure
Pack to contain travellers checks or money orders instead of vouchers."' Ski Co. even-
tually accepted these negotiable instruments in exchange for daily lift tickets. 17" After
the four-area ticket based on usage was abolished in 1977, Highlands' share of the
market for downhill skiing services in Aspen declined steadily." 5
 From 20.5% of the
Aspen market in 1976-1977, Highlands' share fell to 15.7% in 1977-1978, 13.1% in
1978-1979, 12.5% in 1979-1980, and 11% in 1980-1981. 17 '
In 1979, Highlands filed a complaint against Ski Co. in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado. 175 Highlands' complaint alleged that by refusing to
/60 Id
' 6 ' Id.
162 Id.
165 Id.
' 64
 Highlands continued to insist on a distribution of ticket revenues based on usage and
suggested that coupons, electronic counting, or random sample surveys could monitor actual usage.
Highlands also offered to hire disinterested professional ticket counters to survey usage of the four-
area ticket at Highlands. Id.
' 65 Id. at 593.
' 66 Id.
162 Id.
lett
166 Id.
17° Id. at 594.
YU Id.
• ' 22 Id.
' 25 Id.
125 1d. at 594-95.
'" Id. at 595. The first suit regarding the four-area ticket was actually brought in December,
1975, by the Colorado Attorney General. The Attorney General filed a complaint against Ski Co.
and Highlands attacking, under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the conduct involved in
marketing the joint ticket. The complaint alleged that the negotiations over the four-area ticket
provided Ski Co. and Highlands with a forum for price-fixing in violation of section 1 and that the
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cooperate with Highlands — specifically by refusing to continue the joint ticket, by
refusing to facilitate Highlands' substitute joint ticket scheme, and by offering its own
six-day ticket in competition with the joint ticket — Ski Co. had monopolized the market
for downhill skiing services at Aspen in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.'" The
complaint prayed for treble damages.'"
The case was tried to a jury in the district court in June, 1981.' 73 In her instructions
to the jury, the judge explained that the offense of monopolization under section 2 of
the Sherman Act has two elements: the defendant's possession of monopoly power in a
relevant market and its willful acquisition, maintenance, or use of that power by anti-
competitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive or exclusionary purposes. 179
two firms had attempted to monopolize the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen in violation
of section 2. In 1977, the case was settled by a consent decree that permitted the parties to continue
to offer the joint ticket provided that they set their own ticket prices unilaterally before negotiating
its terms. Id. at 591 n.9. When, in 1979, Highlands commenced the instant suit against Ski Co.,
alleging Ski Co.'s withdrawal from the joint ticket violated sections l and 2 of the Sherman Act, a
member of Ski Co.'s management commented, in reference to the Colorado Attorney General's
suit and Highlands' action: "You are damned if you do and you are damned if you don't." Brief
of Petitioner at 5.
176
 472 U.S. at 595. In addition to the allegations of monopolization, Highlands claimed Ski
Co. violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by "attempt[ing] to monopolize the market for downhill
skiing services and multi-area lift tickets in the Aspen, Colorado area" and "combining and/or
conspiring to monopolize" [with Buttermilk Mountain Skiing Corp., Snowmass Skiing Corp, and
other unknown persons] the sale of multi-area lift tickets in the Aspen, Colorado area. Amended
Complaint at 8-9, Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Additionally, Highlands alleged Ski Co. violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by entering into
"contracts, combinations, or conspiracies with each other and with unknown persons resulting in
restraints of trade." Amended Complaint at 10. After the close of evidence at trial, the district court
granted Ski Co.'s motion for a directed verdict with respect to all of Highlands' claims except those
of unlawful monopolization and conspiracy to restrain trade between Ski Co. and non-parties.
'" 472 U.S. at 595.
' 78
 Brief of Petitioner at 5.
179 472 U.S. at 595-96. The instructions elaborated:
In considering whether the means or purposes were anticompetitive or exclusion-
ary, you must draw a distinction here between practices which tend to exclude or
restrict competition on the one hand and the success of a business which reflects only
a superior product, a well-run business, or luck, on the other. The line between the
legitimately gained monopoly, its proper use and maintenance, and improper conduct
has been described in various ways. It has been said that obtaining or maintaining
monopoly power cannot represent monopolization if the power was gained and main-
tained by conduct that was honestly industrial. Or it is said that monopoly power
which is thrust upon a firm due to its superior business ability and efficiency does not
constitute monopolization.
For example, a firm that has lawfully acquired a monopoly position is not barred
from taking advantage of scale economies by constructing a large and efficient factory.
These benefits are a consequence of size and not an exercise of monopoly power. Nor
is a corporation which possesses monopoly power under a duty to cooperate with its
business rivals. Also a company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses
to enter into a joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise refuses to
deal with a competitor in some manner does not violate section 2 if valid business
reasons exist for that refusal.
In other words, if there were legitimate business reasons for the refusal, then the
defendant, even if he is found to possess monopoly power in a relevant market, has
not violated the law. We are concerned with conduct which unnecessarily excludes or
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After finding both elements of the offense as defined in the court's intructions,'" the
jury rendered a special verdict finding Ski Co. guilty of the section 2 violations and
calculated Highlands' actual damages at $2.5 million.' 8 ' The district court thereupon
trebled the verdict and entered judgment of $7.5 million plus attorneys' fees and costs
for the plaintiff.'" The court also issued an injunction requiring the defendant to
participate with the plaintiff in offering a joint four-area, six-day lift ticket for a period
not exceeding three years.'" Ski Co. appealed the district court's judgment to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.'"
On appeal, Ski Co. argued that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to
present a jury issue of monopolization. Ski Co. urged that the district court should have
ruled, as a matter of law, that the challenged conduct was pro-competitive, nonexclu-
sionary behavior in which a monopolist could lawfully engage.'" The Tenth Circuit
affirmed the district court, however, advancing two reasons for rejecting Ski Co.'s ap-
peal.'" First, the court held that the multi-day, multi-area ticket could be characterized
as an "essential facility" that Ski Co. had a duty to market jointly with Highlands.'"
Second, the court held that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ski
Co.'s intent in refusing to market the four-area ticket was to create or maintain a
monopoly.'" In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit observed that in "refusing
to cooperate" with Highlands, Ski Co. "became the only business in Aspen that could
offer a multi-day, multi-mountain skiing experience." 189 The court noted also that the
handicaps competitors. This is conduct which does not benefit consumers by making
a better product or service available — or in other ways — and instead has the effect
of impairing competition.
To sum up, you must determine whether Aspen Skiing Corporation gained,
maintained, or used monopoly power in a relevant market by arrangements and
policies which rather than being a consequence of a superior product, superior business
sense, or historic element, were designed primarily to further any domination of the
relevant market or sub-market.
Id. at 596-97.
180
 The jury, by special verdict, found that Ski Co. possessed monopoly power in the relevant
product market in satisfaction of part one of the court's instructions, See supra note 179. The jury
identified "downhill ski resorts" as the relevant product market and the "Aspen area" as the relevant
geographic submarket. In finding the second element of the section 2 offense satisfied, the jury
answered the following specific interrogatory i& the affirmative:
Willful Acquisition, Maintenance or Use of Monopoly Power: Do you Find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendants willfully acquired, maintained or
used monopoly power by anticompetitive or exclusionary means or for anticompetitive
or exclusionary purposes, rather than primarily as a consequence of a superior prod-
uct, superior business sense, or historic accident?
Aspen, 472 U.S. at 597-98 n.21.
18 ' Id. at 595. While it found for Highlands on the section 2 monopolization claim, the jury
found for Ski Co. on the section 1 conspiracy claim. Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1513.
1" Aspen, 472 U.S. at 598.
183 Id, at 598 n.23. The district court denied post-trial motions by Ski Co. for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, a new trial, and remitter. Id. at 598.
184 Id. at 599.
183 Aspen 1, 738 F.2d at 1516-17 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 40).
'Re Id. at 1527-28.
Id. at 1520-21.
in Id. at 1522.
' 89 1d. at 1521.
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refusal to offer a four-area ticket resulted in consumer frustration over its unavailabil-
ity.'" Finally, the court held that no valid business reason was apparent for Ski Co.'s
refusal to accept the vouchers in Highlands' Adventure Pack. 19 ' The record taken as a
whole, the court concluded, was sufficient for the jury to find Ski Co. guilty of the
section 2 violation. 192
In the Supreme Court, Ski Co. did not dispute the jury's special verdict finding that
Ski Co. possessed monopoly power in the identified relevant market.'" The thrust of
Ski Co.'s argument, rather, attacked the lower courts' analyses of its conduct under the
second or "intent" prong of the Grinnell test. 194
 Ski Co. first contended that even a . firm
with monopoly power has no duty . to engage in joint marketing iwith a competitor.'" Ski
Co. further contended that a plaintiff cannot establish a section 2 violation without
evidence of substantial exclusionary conduct, and that none of its activities could be
characterized as exclusionary)" Ski Co. also argued that the Tenth Circuit incorrectly
relied on the essential facilities doctrine and that mere anticompetitive intent does not
transform nonexclusionary conduct into monopolization.'" Highlands, on the other
hand, contended that the evidence in the record was sufficient to establish a section 2
violation and that the Court need not rely on the essential facilities doctrine to affirm
the judgment. 198
In its unanimous decision in Aspen Skiing Ca. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., the
Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's ruling that Ski Co. violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act) 99
 The Court found that the monopolist's refusal to engage in joint
marketing with Highlands, taken together with the record as a whole, supported , an
inference that the monopolist made a deliberate effort to discourage its customers from
doing business with its smaller rival. 200
 13ecause the trial resolved against Ski Co. the
issue of whether Ski Co. possessed monopoly power and Ski Co. did not challenge this
finding in its appeal to the Supreme Court 2 01 the Court's opinion focused only on
" Id.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 1521-22. See also Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610.
"5 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 596.
194 Id. at 600.
195 Id.
Id. In support of its argument that its refusal to engage in joint marketing with its horizontal
competitor was not exclusionary, Ski Co. argued that its conduct (I) did not restrain Highlands
from bringing its services to market, (2) did not restrain customers from choosing between the two
firms on the merits, (5) was not "predatory," and (4) did not depend for its success on the exercise
of monopoly power. Ski Co. argued strenuously that its conduct merely reflected its decision to
compete rather than cooperate with Highlands and that neither its refusal to engage in joint
marketing with Highlands nor its refusal to sell lift tickets to Highlands or to accept Highlands'
Adventure Pack coupons were in any way exclusionary in the sense that they restrained Highlands
or customers. Brief of Petitioner at 6-7.
197 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600.
198 Id.
199 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610-11.
240 Id. at 610.
441 The jury found by special verdict that the relevant product market was "downhill skiing at
destination ski resorts," that the "Aspen area" was a relevant geographic submarket, and that during
the years 1977-1981, Ski Co. possessed monopoly power. While Ski Co. disputed this element at
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whether there was sufficient evidence presented to show that the second element of the
section 2 offense was satisfied. 202 The Court held that the evidence supported an infer-
ence that Ski Co.'s refusal to deal with Highlands was not motivated by efficiency
concerns, but rather, by a purpose to harm its smaller rival. 203 Thus, applying Grinnell,
the Court concluded that evidenCe was sufficient to find that Ski Co. both possessed and
misused monopoly power and therefore violated section 2 of the Sherman Act in refusing
to deal with Highlands. 2 °4
The Court began its opinion by reaffirming the long-standing doctrine that even a
firm with monopoly power has no general duty to engage in a joint marketing program
with a competitor.m The Court held, however, that the judgment in this case rested on
no such proposition of law.206 While the Court acknowledged that there is indeed no
general duty to transact business with a competitor and that the right of independent
businesses to select their customers and associates is of high value, 20 the Court stated
that the general right to refuse to deal with other firms is not unqualified." 8 Further-
trial and in the court of appeals, the jury's special verdict finding that Ski Co. possessed monopoly
power was not an issue before the Supreme Court. Id. at 596 & n.20.
The jury's determination that the "Aspen area" was the relevant geographic market in this
case, however, is at the least curious. At trial, Ski Co. contested vigorously the instructions given
the jury on the issue of relevant market. Aspen 1, 738 F.2d at 1513-16. The Tenth Circuit disposed
of Ski Co.'s objections to market definition on procedural grounds, ruling only that the instructions
on the relevant market and the resultant verdict did not constitute plain error. Id. at 1516.
It appears incongruous, however, that the relevant product market was "downhill skiing at
destination ski resorts," yet the other major destination ski resorts of the American and Canadian
Rocky Mountains and, indeed, Europe were not included in the geographic market. This is partic-
ularly so when considered in light of the fact, presented at trial, that over 90 percent of Aspen
skiers come from outside Colorado. Brief of Petitioner at 23-24 n.26. It stands to reason that well-
educated, affluent, mobile, and experienced skiers, See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 585, who travel substantial
distances to reach their skiing destinations, consider the other resorts of the Rocky Mountains and
Alps in addition to Aspen in deciding where to spend their ski vacations. It appears that the jury,
in deciding that the relevant geographic submarket was Aspen, based its determination on the fact
that Ski Co.'s conduct was designed to win customers from Highlands once the customers were
already in Aspen. Nevertheless, it appears from the facts that both Ski Co. and Highlands compete
in national and perhaps international markets. Consequently, even if Ski Co. were to monopolize
the market for "downhill skiing services at Aspen" the harm done to consumer welfare would be
minimal.
202 See id. at 600-11.
203 /d. at 610.
204 Id.
205 Id. at 600. See Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. The Colgate doctrine is discussed supra note 22 and
accompanying text.
2" Aspen, 472 U.S. at 600. Indeed, the Court pointed out, the trial court unambiguously
instructed the jury that a firm possessing monopoly power has no duty to cooperate with its business
rivals. Id. See supra note 179.
202 Id. at 601 & n.27 (citing Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761, and Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307, for the
proposition that a business "generally has a right to deal, or refuse to deal, with whomever it likes,
as long as it does so independently").
2" Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601. The Court extensively cited and quoted Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at
155, for the proposition that the right of a single firm to refuse to deal is a qualified one. See Aspen,
472 U.S. at 601-03. The Aspen Court noted that where a private business exercises its general right
to choose persons with whom it deals as a "purposeful means of monopolizing interstate commerce,"
the firm's conduct falls under the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. Id. at 602 (quoting Lorain
Journal, 342 U.S. at 155).
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more, the Court noted, refusal to deal may be significant as evidence of a predominant
firm's monopolistic intent.209 In a monopolization case, the Court elaborated, evidence
of intent is relevant to the question of whether the challenged conduct is fairly charac-
terized as "exclusionary" or "anticompetitive" and thus whether the conduct violates
section 2 of the Sherman Act. 21 °
The Court then turned to an examination of the record to determine Ski Co.'s
purposes in rejecting the joint ticket. The Court began by noting that the qualification
on the right of a monopolist to deal with whom it pleases is not so narrow that it
encompasses no more than the circumstances of Lorain fournal. 2" Conduct less brazen
than the Journal's conduct, the Court declared, may also support an inference of anti-
competitive intent. 212 The Court then cited evidence that Ski Co., an admitted monop-
olist, did not merely reject a novel offer to participate in a cooperative venture that had
been proposed by a competitor; but rather "elected to make an important change in a
pattern of distribution that had originated in a competitive market and had persisted
for several [15] years." 213 The Court also noted that interchangeable tickets are used in
other multi-mountain areas which apparently are competitive, and that "it seems appro-
priate to infer that such tickets satisfy consumer demand in freely competitive mar-
kets."2 " The Court concluded that the issue of Ski Co.'s alleged anticompetitive intent
presented a valid question for the jury. 215 The Court further held that viewing the record
in the light most favorable to respondent Highlands and giving it the benefit of all
inferences which the evidence fairly supported, the jury's verdict on the issue of Ski
Co.'s monopolistic intent in refusing to deal was proper. 216
The Court devoted the remainder of its opinion to a discussion of whether the
record supported the jury's conclusion that Ski Co.'s conduct constituted unlawful mon-
opolization and unreasonably and unjustifiably excluded competition. In analyzing
whether Ski Co.'s conduct may properly be categorized as exclusionary, the Court con-
sidered its effect on Highlands and its impact on consumers. 2 " The Court also considered
whether the conduct impaired competition in an unreasonably restrictive way. The Court
first discussed the effect of the challenged conduct on consumers.218 From a review of
expert testimony heard at trial, the Court found that the all-Aspen ticket was a "superior
product" to the separate Ski Co. and Highlands tickets. 212 The Court noted that the six-
day ticket afforded skiers the opportunity to purchase their tickets at once for the whole
period of their stay in Aspen, thus eliminating the need to stand in line to purchase a
ticket each day. 22° Additionally, the Court found, the four-area ticket provided skiers
greater convenience and flexibility and expanded the variety and number of runs avail-
able to them during the week's vacation. 22 ' Furthermore, the Court pointed out, the
2°9 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601.
2 ") Id at 602.
2" Id. at 603. For a discussion of Lorain Journal, see supra notes 117-25.
212 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 603.
212 1d.
2 ' 4 1d. & n.30.
215 1d. at 604.
216 Id. at 604-05, 610.
417 Id. at 605.
219 Id.
212 Id. at 605-06.
22° Id. at 606.
221 Id.
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ticket was particularly attractive for skiers with family members or companions of dif-
fering abilities. The same six-day all-Aspen ticket offered a beginning skier the ability
to upgrade to more difficult areas through the week and allowed advanced skiers to ski
some days with less advanced friends, while skiing more challenging mountains on other
days.222
While the Court conceded that Ski Co.'s three-area, six-day ticket possessed some
of these attributes, it held that the evidence supported a conclusion that the elimination
of the four-area ticket adversely affected consumers."' Citing comparative sales figures
between the three-area Ski Co. ticket and the all-Aspen ticket in the years after 1967,
the Court concluded that skiers demonstrably preferred four mountains to three. 224
Further, the Court relied on a consumer survey undertaken in the 1979-1980 season
which indicated that 53.7% of those surveyed wanted to ski Highlands but would not,
presumably because it was not accessible on a Ski Co. three-area multi-day ticket. 22 s
Additionally, the Court found that there was evidence that skiers experienced frustration
at not being able to ski Highlands on the three-area Ski Co. pass. 228
The Court next dealt summarily with the adverse impact of Ski Co.'s pattern of
conduct on Highlands. 2" The Court first found that expert testimony adequately de-
scribed the extent of Highlands' pecuniary injury. 225 The Court also found, given High-
lands' attempts to buy Ski Co. tickets in bulk and its efforts to market the Adventure
Pack, that Highlands had tried to protect itself from losing its share of the all-Aspen
ticket patrons.229 Nonetheless, the Court found, as a result of Ski Co.'s conduct, High-
lands' share of the relevant market declined steadily after the four-area ticket was
terminated.23°
Finally, the Court considered Ski Co.'s apparent failure to persuade the jury that a
normal business purpose justified its conduct. The Court held that the jury could
properly have concluded from the evidence presented at trial that Ski Co.'s purpose in
refusing to deal with Highlands was to reduce competition in the Aspen market in the
long run by harming its smaller competitor. 23' Highlands rebutted at trial all of Ski Co.'s
proferred justifications for its decision to terminate the jointly offered ticket — that use
of the ticket could not be properly monitored, that the tickets were administratively
cumbersome, and that Ski Co. desired to disassociate itself from what it considered the
inferior skiing services offered at Highlands. 292 Thus, the Court concluded, in light of
Ski Co.'s "failure to offer any efficiency justification whatever for its pattern of conduct,"
the jury could have found that Ski Co.'s intent in refusing to deal with Highlands was
222 Id. at 606 n.34.
223 Id. at 606.
224 Id. The Court cited evidence that after 1967 the all-Aspen coupon booklet began to outsell
Ski Co.'s ticket featuring only its mountains. Id. at 589-90.
225 Id. at 606.
226 Id. at 607. This evidence was proffered through the testimony of ski-tour promoters, ski
club officials, and Highlands officials. Id.
227 Id. at 607-08. Ski Co. did not dispute the adverse impact of its conduct on Highlands.
222 Id. at 607.
229 Id. at 607-08. On the basis of expert testimony, the jury found Highlands was injured in
the amount of $2.5 million. Id. at 595.
2'° Id. at 608. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
251 Id, at 608.
232 Id. at 608-10.
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predatory and designed to maintain or enhance its monopoly in the market for ski
services at Aspen, Colorado. 233 •
In summary, the Court concluded that while Ski Co.'s pattern of conduct may not
have been as "bold, relentless and predatory" as the publisher's actions in Lorain journal,
the record comfortably supported an inference that Ski Co. made a deliberate effort to
discourage its customers from doing business with its smaller rival."' The Court found
that a desire to injure Highlands motivated Ski Co.'s refusals to market a joint ticket and
accept the Adventure Pack coupons in exchange for daily tickets.235 Thus, the Court
affirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision, finding it unnecessary to consider the possible
relevance of the essential facilities doctrine given its conclusion that the evidence amply
supported the verdict under the trial court's instructions."'
III. THE ASPEN DECISION: BREAKING THE UNWRITTEN , RULES OF SECTION 2
MONOPOLIZATION INQUIRIES
The Court's application of the two-pronged Grinnell test in Aspen to hold unlawful
an unintegrated monopolist's unilateral refusal to continue a cooperative marketing
arrangement with its horizontal competitor is at odds with the purposes and goals of the
Sherman Act. In Aspen, the Court for the first time held that a monopolist violated
section 2 of the Sherman Act where its challenged conduct neither impeded the mo-
nopolist's rivals' ability to bring their services to market nor otherwise obstructed com-
petition between the firms on the firms' respective merits by distorting choice in the
consumer marketplace. In all of the cases decided prior to Aspen in which courts held
refusals to deal violated section 2: the monopolist's illegal conduct involved more than
the mere monopoly power plus intent to monopolize required under Grinnell. In each
of the prior cases, the monopolist's conduct interfered with competition on the merits
or with its rival's ability to bring its product to market. 237 Moreover, the monopolist's
success depended on the existence of its monopoly power." While the Grinnell test does
not expressly require that the plaintiff prove a nexus between the challenged conduct
and the defendant's monopoly power or show that the challenged conduct impaired
competition on the merits, some courts have implicitly recognized the "nexus" and
"impaired competition" elements of a monopolization action under section 2.239 Addi-
tionally, commentators have urged adoption of "nexus" and "impaired competition" as
requisite elements of a prima facie section 2 claim to better effectuate the purposes and
goals of the Act 24° Thus, the requirements of a nexus between the monopolist's conduct
acid its monopoly power and of conduct which impedes competition on the merits are
iti effect the unwritten elements of a monopolization claim.
The Court's failure to expressly recognize and apply these unwritten elements in
Aspen led the Court to an unwarranted result. While Ski Co.'s conduct in refusing to
234 Id. at 608-11.
934 Id. at 610 (quoting Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 149 (quoting Lorain journal Co. v. United States,
92 F. Supp. 794, 796 (N.D. Ohio 1950))).
2" Aspen, 472 U.S. at 610-11.
206 Id. at 611 & n.44.
947 See infra notes 246-84 and accompanying text.
230 See infra notes 246-84 and accompanying text.
239 See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
440 See supra notes 8, 12 and accompanying text.
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deal with Highlands was dependent for its successful exercise on its possession of mo-
nopoly power, neither the nature nor the effect of Ski Co.'s conduct in Aspen was
exclusionary. Despite its satisfaction of the two-pronged Grinnell test and the proposed
nexus requirement, then, the Court should not have held Ski Co.'s conduct violative of
section 2. 241 Ski Co.'s conduct neither impeded Highlands from offering and providing
its services to the market, nor prevented customers from making a fair choice between
Ski Co. and Highlands solely on the basis of the firms' respective facilities. In order to
preserve the intent and effectuate the purposes of the Sherman Act, therefore, the Court
should revise the Grinnell test to require a nexus between the challenged conduct and
monopoly power, and to explicitly define illegal behavior as that which impairs the
competitive process. Only through such redefinition can the courts surehandedly pro-
mote acts legitimately based on fair competition on the merits and penalize exclusionary
conduct unreasonably restrictive of competition.
This section begins with an analysis of the refusal to deal decisions prior to Aspen,
emphasizing that liability only attached in those cases where both the nexus and impaired
competition elements were present in addition to the monopoly power and intent to
monopolize required under Grinnell. The section next compares the test of section 2
liability under Grinnell to the purposes and goals underlying the Sherman Act and
concludes that the courts should expressly recognize these unwritten elements of a section
2 violation in order to better effectuate the purposes of the Act. Section IV of this
casenote then analyzes the potential deleterious impact of the Aspen decision on incentives
of both dominant firms and their rivals to innovate and increase efficiency, 242 future
decisions to enter into productive cooperative arrangements, 243 and future actions for
refusal to dea1. 244 The section then argues that the Grinnell intent-oriented standard is
ill-suited for application to cases factually similar to Aspen, because the test may in such
situations penalize a monopolist's honestly industrial conduct — a result at odds with
the undisputed intents and purposes of the Act. 245 Finally, the casenote concludes that
explicit adoption of the proposed "nexus" - and "impaired competition" requirements,
elements which several courts have implicitly recognized, would substantially reduce the
potential for such undesirable results in future section 2 cases.
A. The Elements Required to Establish Illegal Conduct in Past Refusal to Deal Cases
The factual situation presented to the Court in Aspen differed fundamentally from
the contexts of the Court's prior refusal to deal decisions. Aspen does not involve a
vertically integrated monopolist's refusal to sell any necessary product to its small com-
petitor,24a but rather, the monopolist's refusal to continue to engage in a cooperative
marketing scheme with its smaller competitor. Further, the case does not involve any
"essential facility" over which a monopolist is alleged to exercise contro1, 247 nor does it
24 ' See infra notes 246-303 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 309-17 and accompanying text.
243 See infra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
244 See infra notes 318-23 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 328-34 and accompanying text.
14° See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377; Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 359; Byars, 609 F.2d at 848-
50; Poster Exchange, 431 F.2d at 338-40; Kleerflax, 63 F. Supp. at 40-42. See also supra note 116 and
accompanying text.
"7 See, e.g., Associated Press, 326 U.S. at 3-5; Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 397-400; Gamto, 194
F.2d at 486.
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turn on practices which inhibit free choice in the marketplace or distort competition
between rivals on their respective merits. 218 In essence, the case concerns the refusal of
a monopolist present in only one market249 and operating at only one level of
production250
 to assist its smaller competitor in its marketing efforts by allowing the small
firm to offer as part of its own package of services access to the dominant firm's facilities
as well. Based on a determination that the two firms offered the joint ski-lift ticket in
the past"' and that the dominant firm could produce no valid business reasons for
termination of the long-standing arrangement 252 the Court held that the record pre-
sented sufficient evidence of Ski Co.'s anticompetitive purpose in terminating the ticket
to satisfy the "willful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power" element of the
Grinnell sta ndard."'
Yet in each of the past cases in which the Court used the Grinnell standard to find
a monopolist in violation of section 2 for refusing to deal, more than monopoly power
and intent to monopolize were present. First, in each of these cases there was a nexus
between the firm's monopoly power and its anticompetitive conduct, in addition to the
two required Grinnell elements. The monopolists' conduct in these cases was only suc-
cessful in harming competitors because of and through the use of monopoly power." 4
Thus, the monopolists' conduct in the essential facilities," vertical integration, 456 and
intermarket leveraging257 contexts was only successful in impairing their rivals' ability to
bring their products to market because the rivals could not obtain the necessary resources
refused them by the monopolists from some other source."" It is elementary in these
cases that if the defendants did not wield monopoly power, their attempts to monopolize
by refusing to deal with their competitors would have failed, because the rival firms
easily could have obtained the necessary products or facilities from another supplier.
Similarly, a monopolist's refusal to deal with those who deal with its competitorsm
requires monopoly power in order to be successful. If, for example, a newspaper pub-
249 See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154-55; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 661.
"9 Ski Co. was determined to exert monopoly power in the "Aspen area" submarket of the
market for downhill skiing services at destination ski resorts. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 596 n.20.
299 The only level or stage of production at which Ski Co. operates is the retail furnishing of
downhill skiing facilities to the public. Ski Co. is thus an unintegrated firm, and Highlands, which
produces in the same capacity, is Ski Co.'s horizontal competitor. See supra notes 45-46 and accom-
panying text.
251 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 603.
252 Id. at 608-11.
259 Id. at 610-11. The Court thus upheld the district court's order that the joint ticket be
reinstated and that the dominant firm compensate its smaller rival for damages caused by the
ticket's two year absence. Id. at 611.
254 See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377; Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154-55; Southern Photo, 273
U.S. at 369; Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 397-400.
295 This is the third "category" or "type" of refusal to deal, discussed supra notes 107-16 and
accompanying text.
259 This is the second type of refusal to deal, discussed supra notes 101-06 and accompanying
text.
957 This is the first type of refusal to deal, discussed supra notes 92-100 and accompanying text.
299 See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377 (monopolist only source of wholesale electrical power in
geographic region); Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 369 (monopolist predominant manufacturer of
photographic materials and supplies); Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at 397-400 (monopolists con-
trolled only feasible railroad facilities at St. Louis).
299 This is the fourth recognized category of refusal to deal, discussed supra notes 117-25 and
accompanying text.
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lisher engages in this type of conduct to secure the exclusive patronage of its advertis-
ers,260 it could only succeed in its attempt if it were a monopolist. If five other newspapers
competed with the one that refused to deal, the publisher's refusal to deal would not
compel advertisers to submit to the publisher's conditions and they would thus take their
advertising budgets elsewhere. Only if and because the publisher has monopoly power
and is therefore "indispensable" to advertisers will its attempt to secure the exclusive
patronage of advertisers successfully exclude competitors." ,
Similarly, in Aspen, the Court held that the record was sufficient for the jury to infer
that monopolistic purposes, not valid business considerations, motivated Ski Co.'s refusal
to deal with Highlands."2 Implicit in the Court's finding was that Ski Co.'s refusal to
deal was not conduct reflecting a superior product, a well-run business, or luck, but
rather, conduct constituting a conscious effort by the monopolist to use its monopoly
power to win customers from its smaller rival."3 Thus, implicit in the Court's holding
in Aspen is a finding that a nexus existed between Ski Co.'s monopoly power and its
challenged conduct." Absent monopoly power, the Court indicated, Ski Co. would not
have refused to continue marketing the joint all-Aspen lift ticket with Highlands. 265
While explicit recognition of the need to show a nexus between monopoly power and
260 This was the situation in Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. 143. The defendant Journal Publishing
Co. refused to deal with advertisers who also dealt with the Journal's rival, a start-up radio station.
Id. at 148. Because the Journal reached 99% of all Lorain families, it clearly possessed monopoly
power in that local market. Id. at 149-50, Furthermore, absent its monopoly power, the Journal's
conduct would have had no effect on either the advertisers the Journal sought to influence or the
competing radio station it attempted to exclude. Advertisers would still have had a meaningful
choice to advertise on the radio station and in the other available print media.
261 Id. at 152.
262 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-11.
20 See id. at 605-11.
224 Id. at 607-08. In its brief to the Supreme Court, Ski Co. argued vigorously that its conduct
did not require a connection with monopoly power for its successful exercise and thus did not
violate section 2. Brief of Petitioner at 28-29. Ski Co. argued that its refusals to market a joint
ticket with Highlands, to accept Highlands' coupons, and to sell tickets in bulk to Highlands did
not depend on monopoly power. Id. Any firm, Ski Co. contended, that has a product it believes
will be independently attractive to customers can successfully refuse to cooperate with a competitor.
Id. Because Ski Co.'s refusals merely produced a situation in which Ski Co. and its rival were left
to market their respective products independently of each other, the defendant maintained, the
conduct did not require monopoly power. Indeed, Ski Co. asserted, Highlands itself could have
taken these actions and succeeded, as Ski Co. did, in breaking marketing ties with its competitor.
Id. at 29-31. Similarly, Ski Co. argued, were there 100 ski areas in the Aspen market, Ski Co. could
have just as easily severed marketing ties with its 99 competitors. Ski Co. argued that its refusal to
cooperate, then, did not in any way require monopoly power for its successful execution. Id.
e6' In this respect, Ski Co.'s conduct is analogous to that of the defendant publisher in
Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. 143. See supra notes 259-61 and accompanying text. If the Journal lacked
monopoly power, its policy of refusing to sell advertising to potential customers who purchased
advertising from the rival radio station would be doomed to failure. This is because conduct of this
nature necessarily depends on monopoly power for its successful exercise. The conduct in Aspen
similarly required monopoly power for its successful exercise, given the jury's verdict that Ski Co.'s
conduct was not based on the superiority of its services, facilities, or techniques of management,
but rather, on an intent to monopolize. While it is true, as Ski Co. urged, that Highlands could as
easily and successfully have announced to Ski Co. that it was breaking marketing ties between the
two firms in order to pursue independent marketing policies as the reverse, Highlands would not
have done so, because the only reason a firm would engage in such a practice, the Court implied,
would be to use monopoly power to exclude smaller competitors. See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 608-11.
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conduct would not have changed the result in Aspen, its adoption would certainly provide
the courts with a clearer and more objective test to determine satisfaction of the section
2 monopolization offense and ensure application of the antitrust laws consistent with
their purposes. 266
The Court should thus recognize explicitly what it has heretofore applied implicitly.
The Court should directly examine the relationship between the challenged act and
monopoly power, rather than follow its less certain and more circuitous current approach
of examining the monopolist's purposes in engaging in conduct and then determining
whether the conduct in fact constituted the exercise of monopoly power. Rather than
ask whether the challenged conduct evinces a purpose to use monopoly power to deter-
mine whether the monopolist has violated section 2, it is far more relevant to ask whether
the conduct in fact constitutes the use of monopoly power. It is the actual misuse of monopoly
power, not mere monopolistic purposes or intent, which the Sherman Act prohibits. 267
An objective inquiry into the nature of the challenged conduct, further, is more certain
to distinguish legitimate conduct from conduct reflecting misuse of monopoly power
than is an inquiry into subjective inferences of intent based upon the monopolist's actions.
Second, in each of the refusal to deal cases prior to Aspen, the monopolist's conduct
either prevented a rival from bringing its product to market or otherwise inhibited
competition on the merits by distorting consumers' freedom of choice in the marketplace.
Thus, in each of the first three refusal to deal categories — monopolists' refusals to sell
to effect vertical integration, monopolists' refusals to sell to distort competition in other
markets, and monopolists' refusals to sell or provide access to an essential facility268 —
monopolists denied essential supplies to their rivals or terminated vertical supplier-
customer relationships vital to the rivals' ability to produce their products. 269 These
refusals to deal, then, clearly impaired and in some cases destroyed the ability and
opportunity of rivals to compete effectively in their market against the monopolist.
Refusals to deal in category four,270 typified by the situation in Lorain Journa1, 221
similarly distort the process of competition on the merits. By refusing to deal with those
who deal with its competitors, 272 or by refusing to sell a product over which it exercises
266
 See infra notes 290-98.
267 See, e.g., Berkey, 603 F.2d at 276 ("It is the.use of economic power that creates the liability.");
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430 (essential inquiry is whether monopolist "utilized" its size for "abuse").
25" See supra notes 91-136 and accompanying text.
2'9 See, e.g., Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 377 (refusal to sell wholesale power or allow power lines to
be used for transmission to prevent municipalities from selling power on the retail level); Associated
Press, 326 U.S. at 3-5 (refusal to sell news gathering services); Southern Photo, 273 U.S. at 369
(refusal to sell wholesale photography supplies to retail distributor); Terminal Railroad, 224 U.S. at
397-400 (refusal to allow access to railroad terminal facilities); Home Placement, 682 F.2d at 281
(refusal to sell advertising space to real estate publisher attempting to list housing rental informa-
tion); Byars, 609 F.2d 848-50 (refusal to wholesale periodicals to local distributor); Poster Exchange,
431 F.2d at 338-40 (refusal to wholesale promotional movie posters to retail distributors); Six
Twenty-Nine Productions, 365 F.2d at 486 (refusal to buy advertisements from advertising agency);
Packaged Programs, 255 F.2d at 710 (refusal to buy filmed programs from producer); Cameo, 194
F.2d at 486 (refusal to rent space in produce market building in which retail buyers congregate
and which is accessible to shipping facilities); Kleerflax, 63 F. Supp. at 40-42 (refusal to wholesale
raw linen material to rug manufacturer and distributor).
2" See, e.g., Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 661. See also supra note
117.
271 Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154. See also supra note 117.
272 Lorain Journal, 342 U.S. at 154-55. In Lorain Journal, the Court found that the monopolist's
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,.,
monopoly power to those who do not also purchase from the monopolist in product
markets in which the monopolist has competition, 2" a monopolist clearly goes beyond
competition on the merits which it is the purpose of the Sherman Act to foster. 274 Indeed,
such conduct ,cmtitutes the direct exercise of monopoly power to capture customers
from competitors not on the basis of the monopolist's superior product, services, or price
but, rather, by threats and coercion..
Ski Co.'s conduct, in contrast, in no way impaired Highlands' ability to bring its
product to market; nor did it in any way inhibit competition on the merits between the
two firms. Ski Co.'s refusal to continue the joint ticket did not restrain Highlands'
opportunity to offer its own skiing services to the market.2" Highlands remained free
and fully able to offer its services, and it did so. 276 In addition, while the termination of
the all-Aspen ticket perhaps made patrons less likely to ski at Highlands 277 than if the
companies offered the all-Aspen ticket, the refusal to continue the joint ticket did not
restrain consumers' freedom to choose between Highlands and Ski Co. or secure to Ski
Co. the patronage of any skier who did not prefer its facility to Highlands. 276 Any
ladvantage Ski Co. secured in being able to offer a six-day ticket valid on t tree mountains
derived from its ownership of three mountains, and not from any pre atory or exclu-
sionary ,practices. 279
Indeed: the termination of the joint ticket actually brought the two firms closer to
 •
	 ,1 ,u2: I. ,
the ideal of competition on the merits than they had been durinig the life of the ticket. 2 60
While the all-Aspen ticket was in effect, Ski Co. and Ihlaijds were not merely com-
petitors, but also joint venturers. The two firms collaborated to set the prices and terms
of the ticket on an annual basis, in effect colluding to fix the price for ski services in the
refusal to sell advertising to those who purcluiied advertising from its competitor clearly distorted
the decision of' where to advertise. The Court noted that this scheme forced the prospective
advertiser to choose between one medium or the other; it could not elect to use both, even if it
concluded that both the radio station and the newspaper were, on their own respective merits,
worthwhile places to advertise. Id.
275
	
City Star, 240 F.2d at 661 (where monopolist in television market refused to sell
television commercials to any person who did not also agree to advertise in the monopolist's
newspapers, the monopolist unfairly interfered with consumer choice and competition on the merits
in newspaper advertising, a competitive market).
274 See supra notes 8-16 and accompanying text.
275 See Brief of Petitioner at 20.
270 Id.
277 This might be true if, for example, a skier preferred the convenience and flexibility of a
six-day, three-mountain ticket to purchasing a new daily ticket each day. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 605-
06. This added convenience and flexibility that Ski Co. could offer its patrons, however, was not
unfair or unreasonably exclusionary. It was merely an attribute of Ski Co.'s ownership of three
mountains, one of the "merits" Ski Co. could offer a consumer, and one which it had every right
to market for sale. See Brief for Petitioner at 20-2f.
272 After the demise of the all-Aspen ticket, both firms continued to offer single-day tickets
which enabled skiers to buy exactly as many days at each firm's facilities as they chose. Brief of
Petitioner at 20.
279 Ski Co. in no way interfered with Highlands' ability to sell lift tickets on its mountain or
with an individual patron's ability to ski at both Highlands and Ski Co. mountains. Id. This case
would be analogous to Lorain Journal, see supra note 117, if Ski Co. had refused to sell lift tickets to
those customers who patronized Highlands. No such predatory conduct above and beyond com-
petition on the merits, however, was present in this case.
299 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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Aspen market. 28 ' This behavior itself raised antitrust concerns and resulted in the Col-
orado Attorney General's filing a section 1 suit against Ski Co. and Highlands seeking
remedy of this conspiracy in restraint of trade. 282
In addition to the section 1 implications of the joint ticket, the ticket's existence
distorted competition on the merits between the two firms because it allowed the two
independent producers to tie their services to their competitor's. Through the device of
the all-Aspen ticket, as part of its package of services Highlands could offer skiers access
to Ski Co.'s mountains, and Ski Co. similarly was able to offer access to Highlands'
mountain. Rather than independent competition between the firms on their merits,
during the tenure of the all-Aspen ticket both Ski Co. and Highlands offered access to
facilities that they did not own or maintain . 283
 Without the ticket, Highlands could no
longer tie its facilities to those of Ski Co. and was left to sell its services to the public
independently."4
 Thus, during the ticket's absence, Ski Co. and Highlands each was left
to sell to the public precisely those facilities it operated, and the consuming public was
left free to evaluate the two competitors on the basis of their respective merits and faults
in deciding whose ticket to purchase.
In all of the cases prior to Aspen in which courts found that refusals to deal violated
section 2, more than monopoly power and abuse of monopoly power as required under
the Grinnell test were present. These prior cases all censured conduct which was only
possible due to the presence and exercise of monopoly power and which impeded the
injured firm from bringing its product to market or impaired competition on the merits.
While Ski Co.'s conduct apparently did depend for its success upon the exercise of
monopoly power, Ski Co. did not interfere with Highlands' ability to market its product
or impair consumers' free choice in the marketplace. Ski Co. merely refused to combine
with its smaller horizontal competitor in the joint marketing of both firms' output to the
public. This conduct was not predatory in that it did not unreasonably exclude Highlands
or distort competition between the firms on their respective merits. Indeed, Ski Co.'s
refusal brought the two firms closer to the competitive ideal. Therefore, Ski Co.'s
practices were not of the type that section 2 of the Sherman Act intended to or indeed
should penalize.
B. The Grinnell Standard, the Rale of Exclusionary Conduct, and the Purposes of the Act
In order to effectuate the purposes of the Sherman Act, the Court should refine
the Grinnell test of monopolization to explicitly require that a plaintiff show a nexus
281 See Brief of Petitioner at 3-5; Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 11.9.
282 Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n.9. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
288 Logically, since "skiers demonstrably preferred" access to four mountains on a single lift-
ticket to only three, Aspen, 472 U.S. at 606, the cooperation of Ski Co. and Highlands in issuing
the all-Aspen ticket made Aspen a more attractive resort to potential visitors than it otherwise would
have been. It is likely, therefore, that the all-Aspen ticket bolstered the competitive standing of the
Aspen areas relative to other destination ski resorts. It is probable, then, that competing destination
ski resorts in the western United States suffered competitive injury as a result of this cooperative
scheme between Highlands and Ski Co. Thus, although not al issue in the Aspen case, it is quite
conceivable that the all-Aspen ticket constituted a conspiracy to restrain trade in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act.
284 As Ski Co. adeptly noted in its brief, by terminating the joint ticket, Ski Co. "removed the
umbrella that had partially sheltered Highlands from the demands of the market." Brief of Peti-
tioner at 22.
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between the challenged conduct and monopoly power and demonstrate that the mo-
nopolist's conduct impairs the competitive process. Because it is the purpose of the
Sherman Act to prohibit only abuses of monopoly power, and not monopoly obtained
through honestly • competitive conduct, 2" a test which requires these two additional
elements to prove a claim of unlawful monopolization would improve the current two-
pronged standard of Grinnell. Explicit adoption of the "nexus" and "impaired competi-
tion" requirements as elements of the offense of monopolization would better enable
the courts to distinguish prohibited exclusionary or predatory conduct from behavior
consistent with competitive ideals. 2" Express recognition of the implicit standard of
liability in past refusal to deal decisions would provide courts and juries with a more
useful and accurate definition of anticompetitive conduct. 287 As the Aspen decision makes
clear, a monopolist's possession of monopoly power and intent to use that power to harm
a competitor are not enough in some situations to identify the type of conduct the Act
intended to prohibit."'
In broad terms, in enacting the antitrust laws, "Congress was dealing with compe-
tition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which it sought to prevent.""" Monopoly
power is not, however, per se unlawful.'" The courts have consistently held that monopoly
resting on economies of scale or obtained by skill, foresight, and industry does not violate
the antitrust laws."' The Act unequivocally lays down a policy of competition 292
 and
188 See supra notes 7-15 and accompanying text.
288 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. As noted in MCI, "[clout-is have consistently
found monopolization where predatory or exclusionary conduct was proven." MCI, 708 F.2d at
1108 n.35. See Hanover Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 392 U.S. 481, 485-86 (1968); United
States v. U.S. Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343-44 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 521
(1954); Watson Sc Bruner, Monopolization by Regulated "Monopolies": The Search for Substantive Stan-
dards, 22 ANTITRUST BULLETIN 559, 590 n.83 (1977). See also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 273-76
(integrated monopolist's failure to predisclose innovations, and its ability to sell monopolized and
competitive products as a system are not unlawful uses of monopoly power but rather, legitimate
advantages of size and integration); Telex, 510 F.2d at 927-28 (reversing finding of section 2 liability
in the absence of predatory conduct).
287 See supra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
2" See supra notes 275-84 and accompanying text.
289 Standard Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 340 U.S. 231, 249 (1951); 1 AREEDA & TURNER,
supra note 2, 1 1103.
299 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
"' Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570-71; Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430; United Shoe Mach., 110 F. Supp. at 342.
See also Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 274 ("considerations of fairness and the need to preserve proper
economic incentives prevent the condemnation of § 2 from extending ... to one who has gained
his power by purely competitive means.")
"2 Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 4-5 (1957). See also United States v.
Topco Assoc., where the Court stated:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta
of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom
and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fun-
damental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every business,
no matter how small, is the freedom to compete — to assert with vigor, imagination,
devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). This "freedom to compete" is also guaranteed a monopolist. Berkey Photo,
603 F.2d at 281 NA] monopolist is permitted, and indeed encouraged, by 2 to compete aggres-
sively on the merits [and therefore] any success that it may achieve through 'the process of invention
and innovation' is clearly tolerated by the antitrust laws.").
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entrusts the courts to apply the Act to punish those business practices which suppress
competition, restrain trade, or curb competition on the merits.295
 Conduct which does
not involve the willful use of monopoly power to injure a competitor's ability to compete
or curb competition on the merits, then, does not constitute an abuse of monopoly power
and does not run afoul of the intents and purposes of the Act. 294
Only where a monopolist uses monopoly power to obtain an advantage over its
competitors, that is, where a nexus exists between the monopoly power and the monop-
olist's capture of customers from its rival, does the monopolist's conduct become unrea-
sonably exclusionary and unlawful under section 2. 295 If a firm could have carried out
the challenged conduct successfully without monopoly power, the conduct by definition
does not require monopoly power for its exercise. Such conduct, lacking the essential
connection to monopoly power, does not exclude competition on the unfair basis of
monopoly power but rather, on the legitimately competitive basis of superior operations
or facilities. 296 Thus, because all unreasonably exclusionary acts are predicated on mo-
nopoly power297
 and it is only exclusionary conduct at which the Sherman Act's prohib-
itions are aimed,298 liability should not attach under section 2 absent proof of a nexus
between a defendant's monopoly power and its challenged conduct.
299 See, e.g., Northern Pac., 356 U.S. at 6 (holding that tying arrangements — agreements by
which a party agrees to sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases a
different (or tied) product —"are unreasonable in and of themselves whenever a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain free competition in the
market for the tied product .. .."). See also Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 658-59.
294 Indeed, at its very heart, the Sherman Act seeks to encourage conduct promotive of com-
petition. As the Court in Northern Pac. noted,
The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on
the premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the
greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive
to the preservation of our democratic political and social institutions. But even were
that premise open to question, the policy unequivocally laid down by the Act is
competition.
Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. at 4.
295 Because all competitive moves tend to exclude, that is, to win over customers from rival
firms, it is only that conduct which employs the we of monopoly power to win customers from rivals
that is "unfair'. or unreasonably exclusionary. See 3 ÄREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2, VI 603b, 626.
A monopolist who drives out or excludes rivals by selling a superior product or producing at
substantially lower costs does not make unfair use of its monopoly power. The monopolist has
merely excluded its rivals by virtue of its skills as a producer. Such conduct, whether engaged in
by a monopolist or by anyone else, embodies the "essence of vigorous competition" which it is the
policy of the Sherman Act to promote, not inhibit. Id. ¶ 603b. See also Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767
("[A]n efficient firm may capture unsatisfied customers from an inefficient rival .... This is the
rule of the marketplace and is precisely the sort of competition that promotes the consumer interests
that the Sherman Act aims to foster."); U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. at 451 ("the law does not make
mere size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence"); Calcamp, 613 F.2d at 735
n.6 ("[Plower obtained by the kind of behavior that competition is thought to foster, if not compel,
[is] immune [from antitrust scrutiny] even though businesses and business opportunities [may be]
destroyed in the process."); Telex, 510 F.2d at 925-26 (question of whether there has been a section
2 violation necessitates inquiry as to whether the challenged acts "constitute the use of monopoly
power" (emphasis in original)).
296 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
295 See supra notes 8-9,13-15 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, a court should not hold that a monopolist's conduct which does not
interfere with its competitor's ability to bring its product to market 299 or otherwise impair
competition on the merits between the two 1irms 300 violates the antitrust laws. Unless the
monopolist has engaged in acts which restrict the ability or opportunities of a rival to
compete, or which distort free choice in the marketplace, its acts are neither predatory
nor unreasonably exclusionary."' Where, in the wake of the monopolist's conduct, the
rival firm remains fully able to bring its product to market and consumers remain
unfettered in choosing between the firms' offerings, the monopolist has not interfered
with the process of competition on the merits.'" The Sherman Act, then, which Congress
designed only to penalize conduct which hinders or encumbers the competitive pro-
cess,'" should not be triggered in such cases.
IV. THE IMPACT OF ASPEN SKIING CO. V. ASPEN HIGHLANDS SKIING CORP.
The Court's decision in Aspen reveals the inadequacy of Grinnell's two-element test
of monopolization. Application of the Grinnell standard in Aspen produced the undesir-
able result of penalizing an unintegrated monopolist's refusal to continue to engage in
a joint marketing venture with its horizontal competitor, conduct which is not at odds
with, but is indeed consistent with, the competitive values which underlie the Sherman
Act. Furthermore, the decision is likely to hinder the incentives of both Ski Co. and
Highlands to improve the quality of their operations in the future and to undertake the
risks of expansion. Additionally, by creating uncertainty as to the freedom of a monop-
olist to terminate a joint venture with its horizontal competitor, the Aspen decision may
forestall the formation of productive cooperative ventures in the future. Finally, the
Aspen decision has portentous implications for future suits in which a party is alleged to
have monopolized unlawfully by refusing to deal.
A. The Aspen Decision is Contrary to the Sherman Act's Goal of Promoting Competition
The undisputed goal of the Sherman Act is to preserve freely competitive markets.'"
Toward that end, the Act penalizes conduct which harms the competitive process by
inhibiting competition between rivals on their respective merits."' In general, however,
the Act imposes no duty upon a monopolist to cooperate with its rivals." 6 Indeed, such
cooperation between rivals is often anathema to the purposes of the antitrust laws."'" In
299 See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
3°° See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text.
50 ' See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
5°2 See supra notes 7-12 and accompanying text.
503 See supra notes 291-95 and accompanying text.
3" See supra notes 294-95.
505 See supra notes 8-15. Cf supra note 286.
3°6
	
commentators have noted, "filn general, the monopolist has no duty to help his rivals
enter, survive, or expand .... He need not provide the rival with a machine or component for
purposes of examination or copying. Nor is he obliged to provide a sample of his product or
otherwise facilitate the comparative testing of his product against that of a rival." 3 AREEDA
TURNER, supra note 2, 11 738m (footnotes omitted).
507 Cooperation between rivals is apt to create opportunities for contracts, combinations, or
conspiracies in restraint of trade, which violate section 1 of the Act. See supra note 3. Such unlawful
practices might take the form of agreements between competitors to limit production, fix prices,
or boycott a particular buyer or customer. See supra notes 19,23-24 and accompanying text.
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a recent section 1 decision, the Court reaffirmed that "Mlle central message of the
Sherman Act is that a business entity must find new customers and higher profits through
internal expansion — that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties
with its competitors." 3 ° 3
The guiding principles behind the Act, then, mandate a result directly opposite that
reached in Aspen. Prior to the 1978-1979 season, there existed between Ski Co. and
Highlands just such a "treaty between competitors" that the Act proscribes. 30 Indeed,
the all-Aspen ticket and the process of negotiation and cooperation that attended it drew
fire from the government in the form of an action under section 1 of the Sherman
Act.3 '° Upon termination of the firms' cooperative marketing venture, Highlands and
Ski Co. were left to compete independently with each other for skiers' patronage, based
on each skier's perception of the two firms' relative merits. One of the benefits Ski Co.
could offer to prospective customers by virtue of its ownership of three mountains was
a lift ticket interchangeable among three mountains. The ability to offer a multi-moun-
tain ski package was simply a product of Ski Co.'s skill, foresight, and industry in
purchasing and developing the three areas. In the wake of the all-Aspen ticket's demise,
Highlands, similarly, was unimpaired in its ability to market to the skiing public the
facilities it owned and the services it could provide. Competition between the two firms
on their respective merits, the central objective of the Sherman Act, continued unabated.
Indeed, the demise of the all-Aspen ticket produced a situation more closely approxi-
mating the ideal of competition on the merits than did the situation which existed during
the life of the ticket.'" While the ticket existed, Highlands was able to sell its services in
conjunction with those of Ski Co., in effect marketing the two firms' outputs jointly.
303 United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975). See Tapas, 405
U.S. at 610-11 in which the Court condemned, as a per se violation of section 1, territorial
restrictions imposed by a supermarket cooperative association (Topco) upon its member supermar-
kets which limited the freedom of its individual members to compete with each other. The Court
noted that the Sherman Act gives to each Topco member ... the right to ascertain for itself
whether or not competition with other supermarket chains is more desirable than competition in
Topco-brand products. Without territorial restrictions, Topco members may indeed '[cut] each
other's throats,'" but, the Court indicated, this is precisely the competitive behavior the Sherman
Act seeks to encourage. Id. See also Associated General Contractors v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 538 (1983) ("our prior cases have emphasized the central interest in
protecting the economic freedom of participants in the relevant market"); Community Communi-
cations Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56 n.19 (1982) (the antitrust laws embody "the
longstanding Congressional commitment to the policy of free markets and open competition");
Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 291 ("The purpose of the Sherman Act ... is not to maintain friendly
business relations among firms in the same industry, nor was it designed to keep these firms happy
and gleeful.").
309 The Court also found that treaties between competitors violated the Sherman Act in Grinnell,
384 U.S. at 576. In Grinnell, the Court held unlawful restrictive agreements that pre-empted for
each company a segment of the market where it was free of competition from the others. Id.
313 The suit brought by the Attorney General of Colorado in December of 1975 against Ski Co.
and Highlands emphasizes the anticompetitive nature and potential of the all-Aspen ticket. The
complaint alleged, in part, that the negotiations over the four-area ticket had provided the defen-
dants Ski Co. and Highlands with a forum for price-fixing in violation of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and that they had attempted to monopolize the market for downhill skiing services in Aspen
in violation of section 2. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 591 n.9. While the case was settled by a consent decree
that'allowed the parties to continue to offer the four-area ticket provided that they set their own
ticket prices unilaterally before negotiating its terms, id., the challenge to the ticket makes clear the
potential for anticompetitive conduct that the joint ticket created.
3" See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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The Court's decision in Aspen also impairs the competitive process by dulling incen-
tives to compete. The joint ticket effectively operated to shield Highlands from the
competitive rigors of the market by allowing it to tie itself to Ski Co.'s facilities. In
penalizing Ski Co. for its withdrawal from the cooperative venture and in ordering the
joint ticket reinstated, the Court has injured the competitive process in two ways. First,
by penalizing conduct not shown to be unreasonably exclusionary, the Court has dulled
the incentive of firms with market power to innovate and to compete and perform
efficiently. 312 If Ski Co. is not allowed to appropriate exclusively the benefits of its
legitimately acquired economies of scale, but rather, must share some of its advantage
with its competitor, Ski Co. may be unwilling to take such risks in expanding in the
future.313 The resulting decline in innovation and economic efficiency caused by stag-
nation of the dominant firm in the market will adversely affect consumers.'" Second,
the Court's ruling, in protecting Highlands from competing head-on with Ski Co.,
reduces Highlands' incentive to improve its own facilities and services or to make itself
more attractive to consumers in other ways. Thus, Highlands is less likely to expand its
5 " The courts have long been aware of the harmful disincentive effects produced by an
inappropriate application of the antitrust laws. As Judge Hand cautioned in Alcoa, "the successful
competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins." Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 130. More recently, the Second Circuit warned that a "wooden" application of the antitrust
laws to condemn a monopolist that achieves success in competition on the merits might "deprive
the leading firm in an industry of the incentive to exert its best efforts." Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at
273. "The antitrust laws", the court continued, "would thus compel the very sloth [i.e. complacent
behavior by monopolists] they were intended to prevent." Id.
" See, for example, Berkey Photo, in which Kodak, an undisputed giant in the photographic
equipment and supplies markets, was alleged to have used its monopoly power in the film market
to monopolize and attempt to monopolize the still camera market. Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 267-
68. The district court held that Kodak had a duty to give prior disclosure of its plans to introduce
a new camera line to its competitors, in order for them to have an opportunity to develop a similar
competitive product. Id. at 268. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that "111f a firm that has
engaged in the risks and expenses of research and development were required in all circumstances
to share with its rivals the benefits of those endeavors, this incentive would very likely be vitiated."
Id. at 281.
Indeed, as the Second Circuit noted in Berkey Photo, lilt is the possibility of success in the
marketplace, attributable to superior performance, that provides the incentives on which the proper
functioning of our competitive society rests." Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281. As many economic and
legal commentators have pointed out, monopolists are often important sources of innovation. See
generally J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 82 (1939) (In the search for the
source of the most conspicuous innovations of the modern age, "the trail leads not to the doors of
those firms that work under conditions of comparatively free competition but precisely to the doors
of the large concerns ... and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had
more to do with creating that [high] standard of life than keeping it down."); J. SCHUMPETER, THE
THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 131-32 (1934) (large and powerful firms are the engine of
innovation, and innovation is the long-run basis for expanding output and lowering prices ....
Temporary monopoly profits, which result from innovation, are not only acceptable, but indeed
are necessary to stimulate innovation.); Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L.
REV. 925, 925-33 (there is no reason for a monopolist to be less innovative than a normal com-
petitor); Comment, Antitrust Scrutiny of Monopolists' Innovations, 93 HARV. L. REV. 408, 418 ("If
consumers are to reap the fullest possible benefits from technological change, not only must
innovations be marketed in a manner that allows consumers to choose freely between new products
and those already on the market, but normal incentives to innovate must be preserved, even for
monopolists.").
But see Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427 ("[i]mmunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry a
stimulant, to industrial progress ... the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone").
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facilities, lower its lift ticket prices, improve its ski school, or add new services than it
would be if the competitive process functioned unimpeded."
The Court's ruling in Aspen, then, cuts against the fundamental policy of promoting
competition which underlies the Sherman Act. As Senator Hoar remarked in the legis-
lative debates, Congress did not intend section 2 of the Sherman Act to apply to one
"who merely by superior skill and intelligence ... got the whole business because nobody
could do it as well."" In holding Ski Co. liable for the section 2 violation, however, the
Court in effect ruled that Ski Co. may not alone enjoy the fruits of its superior skill and
intelligence in developing its facilities and bringing millions of skiers per year" to the
Aspen market, but must share these benefits with its rival. In so ruling, the Court ordered
Ski Co. to acquiesce in a venture that diverts revenue from itself to Highlands. The
Court has implicitly disapproved of robust competition on the merits between the firms,
cooled the dominant firm's incentive to expand, and lessened the incentives of the smaller
firm to carve for itself a niche in the market through introduction of new services or
improvements; to operate profitably without ties to Ski Co.
8. Aspen's Impact on Future Dealings Between Competitors and on Future Antitrust Litigation
Courts may extend the Aspen decision, applying the Grinnell test to find a monopo-
list's refusal to cooperate with its rival in a joint marketing arrangement a violation of
section 2, to situations where two rival competitors do not have a past history of dealing,
but where the smaller rival has unsuccessfully sought such an arrangement." Subject
only to a requirement that the antitrust plaintiff show that the defendant possesses
monopoly power and that by refusing to deal with the smaller competitor the dominant
firm is willfully maintaining that power, the small firm presumably can get to the jury
on its section 2 claim" Unless the monopolist can show legitimate business reasons for
its refusal to deal, then, the smaller rival can force the monopolist to cooperate. 320 Thus,
the Aspen decision creates the very real possibility of a small competitor using the Act as
a sword against a larger rival in order to affiliate itself with the rival's superior product
or services and avoid the competitive rigors of the marketplace. 32 I As in Aspen, the
315
 As long as Highlands is guaranteed a steady flow of customers to the Aspen market and is
able to secure patronage on Ski Co.'s coattails through the joint ticket arrangement, Highlands is
less likely to expand or improve its facilities or lower the price of its services than if fully free
competition on the merits prevailed.
5 ' 5 21 CoNG. REC. 3151-52 (1890).
8'7 The Aspen area routinely attracts over one million skier visits per year. Aspen, 472 U.S. at
591 ni I.
3L8 Survey, Supreme Court Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. Rev. 120, 279 n.39 (1985) [hereinafter
Leading Casesl.
' 9 384 U.S. at 570-71. Under the standard announced in Grinnell and applied in Aspen, 472
U.S. at 600-11, this is all that is required to produce a prima facie showing of a section 2 mono-
polization violation.
525 See supra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
32 ' See Leading Cases, supra note 318, at 279 n.39. One of the great questions raised by the
Court's decision in Aspen is to what extent monopolists now have an affirmative duty to deal. Prior
to Aspen, it was relatively certain that a single firm acting independently could choose to deal or
not to deal with whomever it desired. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. It was also well established that the
antitrust laws imposed upon a single firm no duty to help or assist its competitors in the absence
of an additional relationship between the parties (e.g., supplier-purchaser). See supra notes 92-116
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smaller competitor gets a free ride; despite its ownership of a small business with limited
facilities and resources purchased for a small investment, it caniprovide its customers
access to the same facilities that the larger firm, through grenter,investment and possibly
superior resourcefulness and foresight, is able to offer,it is-gustorners. Thus, the smaller
competitor shares with the monopolist the advantagespf scale,;although the smaller firm
bore far less risk and exercised no superior skill or Joresight. 322 This is an unsatisfactory
result for an economic system based on rewarding.performance, efficiency, and successful
risk-taking.323 1-1;:r!
Additionally, Aspen introduces uncertainty into the realm of business dealings be-
tween competitors which is likely to produ%unclesirable results. First, knowing that it
will be unable to terminate a joint venturGoivith,its„smaller- competitor at will absent its
ability to show in court that legitimate ,bius,i,riess,reasons motivated the termination, a
market-dominant firm will hesitate to ent.er, ri,to.such an agreement, despite its current
attractiveness to both parties. Thus, App,s.rwill, not undertake economically productive
ventures and activities; ultimately, sueAi afesult will harm individual businesses and the
national economy. 524 Second, becausei lhe second prong of the Grinnell standard is based
purely on subjective inferences of t ►e intent of amonopolist in refusing to dea1, 325 rather
than more objective factors such asit tlig existence of a nexus between the conduct and
monopoly powerno and whether :i a plain,tiff .rival has been impaired in ,its , ability to
produce or sell its product, 52 ' warket-dominant firm's task in planning,its competitive
strategy is difficult.
Expansion of the Grinnell standard to include these two conduct-oriented elements 525
would serve three worthy srls ;,..First, it would better enable courts and juries to distin-
and accompanying text. Seel	 p) A & TURNER, supra note 2, at 11738m CIO general, the
monopolist is under no duty tp help his rivals enter, survive, or expand.").
The Sherman Act deès;''hbwevei, prohibit (impose negative duties upon) certain unilateral
conduct by monopolists. SVi, Journal, 342 U.S. at 154; Kansas City Star, 240 F.2d at 661.
Thus, a recent Seventh Circuit opinion stated that "[t]here is a difference between positive and
negative duties, and the antitrust laws, like other legal doctrines sounding in tort, have generally
been understood to itnpose'only the latter." USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505,
513 (7th Cir. 1982). See also MCI, where the court noted that "[g]ranting MCI multipoint intercon-
nections would have enabled MCI to compete with AT & T for long distance traffic into areas
where MCI may have made no significant capital investment." MCI, 708 F.2d at 1149. In holding
the evidence insufficient to permit a finding that AT & T's conduct was primarily motivated by an
illegal attempt to monopolize, the court balked at using the antitrust laws to "impose upon Al' &
T the extraordinary obligation to fill in the gaps in its competitor's network." Id.
In the wake of Aspen, however, the right of a firm to refuse a competitor's offer of a joint
venture or to withdraw from a cooperative relationship with a rival is very,much in doubt.
522 See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
5" Indeed, as the Second Circuit pointed out in Berkey Photo, "[I]t is the possibility of success
in the marketplace attributable to superior performance, that provides the incentives on which the
proper functioning of our competitive economy rests." Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 281.
324 Certainly the threat of not being able to terminate a joint venture at will in the future and
the aura of uncertainty now attending such proposed ventures will give negotiating parties hesitation
before consummating a deal. Where great uncertainties are present, such as those created by the
Aspen decision, joint venturers will engage only in those dealings they estimate will be sufficiently
profitable to compensate For the heightened degree of risk. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 622-23
(12th ed. 1985).
323 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
326 See supra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
327 See supra notes 268-84 and accompanying text.
325 See supra notes 254-84 and accompanying text. This is the approach section 111 of this
casenote suggests.
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guish conduct which interferes with competition on the merits — which the Act intends
to condemn — from those practices which are not the product of monopoly power and
do not alter the competitive balance between rivals on some basis other than superior
skill, efficiency, or resourcefulness." Second, the proposed standard would reduce the
possibility of penalizing conduct which does not impinge upon competition on the merits
and thus avoid the concomitant chilling effects on incentives to compete." 0 Third,
addition of the nexus and impaired competition elements to the test of a section 2
monopolization offense would provide a more objective test of liability on which busi-
nesses can more reliably chart their future competitive strategies."'
By ordering Ski Co. to combine with Highlands in offering a four-area ski ticket to
the public, the Court has in effect turned the policies underlying the Sherman Act on
their head. The Court's decision forces Ski Co. to share with Highlands the fruits of its
larger and more varied ski facilities, developed by Ski Co. at great risk and expense,
simply because the two firms had agreed to collaborate in the past and a jury could infer
that an intent to drive Highlands from the market motivated Ski Co.'s conduct.'" The
Court's decision actually forbids competition between the two firms on their independent
merits and forces the dominant firm, against its wishes, business judgment, and best
interests, to market its end product jointly with its horizontal competitor, a course of
dealing it believes inures to the benefit of the competitor at its own expense and detri-
ment.
Finally, the Court's decision in Aspen has portentous implications for future suits
under section 2 of the Sherman Act and for future business arrangements between
competitors."' Under the Grinnell test as applied in the Aspen decision, presumably any
dominant firm engaged in a joint venture with a smaller competitor is not at liberty to
terminate the venture should the smaller firm insist on its continuance, unless the
monopolist can convince a jury of its legitimate intentions in refusing to go along with
the cooperative arrangement. Further, to the extent that the Court's holding is not
limited to the fact that Ski Co. and Highlands had a past history of dealing,'" there is
"NJ
	
supra notes 285-303 and accompanying text.
5" See supra notes 304-11 and accompanying text.
531 See supra notes 324-27 and accompanying text.
"2 Winning customers from competitors is, of course, the essence of competition and the
impetus of all competitive acts. 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 2,11626. Mere "intent to exclude"
a competitor, then, is not necessarily unlawful because all competition tends to exclude. Id. It is
only those practices which aim to exclude through the use of monopoly power that are unfairly or
unreasonably exclusionary and are thus the targets of the Act's prohibitions. Id. See also supra notes
8,12,14 and accompanying text.
333 See supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text.
5" See Aspen, 472 U.S. at 603. While the Court considered the history of the cooperative venture
as a factor in determining Ski Co.'s intent in refusing to deal with Highlands, nowhere in its opinion
does the Court state that the history of the cooperative marketing scheme in Aspen was an express
basis of the decision. Nor does the Court limit its decision to situations where pre-existing relation-
ships are terminated. It appears that a past history of dealing is merely a factor to be considered
by the finder of fact in determining a monopolist's intent in refusing to deal. Id. at 603-05. Similarly,
the Court does not hold that Highlands had any legitimate expectancy or reliance interest in the
continuation of the joint ticket, and indeed, no such conclusion appears warranted. The all-Aspen
ticket was renewed annually by mutual consent of the parties, and the parties never entered into
long-term agreements or commitments with regard to the ticket. See Aspen I, 738 F.2d at 1512.
Clearly, Highlands was free to negotiate a long-term agreement with respect to the ticket, but either
neglected to do so or believed such an agreement would not be in its best interest. Regardless, in
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a danger that small firms competing in other markets can now use the Aspen holding to
force dominant firms operating in those markets to deal with them at their behest. The
threats posed to free enterprise by these implications are great. The Court's ruling in
Aspen effectively confiscates from a dominant firm the right to enjoy exclusively the
benefits and profits of its large-scale operations, superior services, or innovative produc-
tion processes, and forces it to share some of these benefits with its less well-situated
competitors. The decision also inhibits business dealings by casting over them a blanket
of uncertainty. In light of Aspen, a market-dominant firm may well hesitate to enter into
a cooperative venture with a competitor advantageous to both parties — as the Ski Co.-
Highlands venture was in its early years — for fear of being unable to terminate the
venture, should it later become apparent that the arrangement is no longer in its best
interest.
V. CONCLUSION
In Aspen, the Court for the first time held that an unintegrated monopolist's unilat-
eral refusal to deal with its horizontal competitor violated the monopolization offense of
section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Court held that the Grinnell test was the appropriate
standard to apply in this case and that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence at
trial on both the monopoly power and the "willful acquisition" or "intent" elements of
the test to uphold the jury's finding that Ski Co. monopolized illegally in violation of
section 2. In holding that the Grinnell standard was the proper test of monopolization
in Aspen, the Court condemned conduct which neither impeded the monopolist's rival's
ability to compete nor obstructed the process of competition on the merits. In so doing,
the Court obscured the central purposes of the Sherman Act, to punish the abuse of
monopoly power and to protect and promote honest competition between firms on their
respective skills and efficiencies, merits, and faults. A test which expressly requires proof
of two additional elements — a nexus between the defendant's monopoly power and the
challenged conduct and a showing of impaired competition or a rival's impaired ability
to compete — would better enable the courts to distinguish unreasonably exclusionary
conduct, which the Act intends to condemn, from legitimately competitive practices,
which the Act seeks to foster. Finally, the injuries to business incentives, freedom to
contract, and robust competition on the merits which Aspen inflicts undermine some of
the fundamental tenets and mechanisms of the free enterprise system, the very tenets
and processes it is the stated purpose of the Sherman Act to protect.
DAVID M. RIEVMAN
the absence of any such arrangement or contract, Highlands could not reasonably have relied upon
the ticket's perpetual renewal.
